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Abstract

Security policies stipulate restrictions on the behaviors of systems to prevent them
from behaving in harmful ways. One way to ensure that systems satisfy the constraints of
a security policy is through the use of security enforcement mechanisms. To understand
the fundamental limitations of such mechanisms, formal methods are employed to prove
properties and reason about their behaviors. The particular formalism employed, however,
typically depends on the time at which a mechanism operates.
Mechanisms operating before a program’s execution are static mechanisms, and mechanisms operating during a program’s execution are dynamic mechanisms. Static mechanisms
are fundamentally limited in the types of policies that they can enforce, due to the lack of
runtime information. However, the class of policies enforceable by particular types of dynamic mechanisms typically depends on the capabilities of the mechanism.
An open, foundational question in computer security is whether additional sorts of
security mechanisms exist. This dissertation takes a step towards answering this question
by presenting a unifying theory of security mechanisms that casts existing mechanisms into
a single framework based on the granularity of program code that they monitor. Classifying
mechanisms in this way provides a unified view of security mechanisms and shows that
all security mechanisms can be encoded as dynamic mechanisms that operate at one or
more levels of program code granularity. This unified view has allowed us to identify new
types of security mechanisms capable of enforcing security policies at various levels of code
granularity. This dissertation also demonstrates the practicality of the theory through a
prototype implementation that enables security policies to be enforced on Java bytecode
v

applications at various levels of code granularity. The precision and effectiveness of the
implementation hinges on an extensible Java library that we have developed, called JaBRO,
that enables runtime code analysis on optimized Java bytecode at runtime. It is shown that
JaBRO allows some security policies to be enforced more precisely at runtime than statically
operating mechanisms.

vi

Chapter 1: Introduction

Formal methods for security have become increasingly popular within the last few
decades. For some systems, incorrect behavior can be detrimental for users of the system;
for example, the malfunction of an avionics system may be life threatening to passengers of an
aircraft [41]. Traditional testing methods (e.g., unit tests) cannot provide sound guarantees
that a system will always behave correctly. This limitation is a result of the complexity of
computer systems, which are typically capable of operating in an infinite number of ways.
Testing the functionality of a system can only result in the guarantee that a system behaves
correctly with respect to a finite set of test cases; therefore, it is nearly impossible for
programmers to consider all possible test cases if a system can take infinitely many possible
inputs.
Formal methods provide mathematical means to rigorously prove whether a system
behaves in accordance with a formal specification [31]. With respect to security, these specifications are called security policies and typically place constraints on untrusted programs.
In practice, systems should be able to interact with, or run, untrusted programs. For example, email users may desire the ability to receive attachments through email. However,
email attachments provide a way to spread viruses to computer systems [78]. To aid in the
detection of malicious attachments, some email users may use a security mechanism, such
as antivirus software or a spam filter, to prevent downloading such attachments. However,
due to fundamental limits of computation, one should not blindly trust security mechanisms
that claim to enforce particular security policies, but should be able to verify such claims.

1

Therefore, it is imperative to understand which policies are enforceable by particular types
of security mechanisms.
To provide guarantees about which policies security mechanisms can enforce, formal
frameworks are employed to rigorously model and reason about their behaviors. However, the
type of formalism employed generally depends on whether the mechanism enforces policies
statically or dynamically. Some policies can be enforced either way. One such example is type
safety, which is a policy that partitions well-typed programs from ill-typed programs. Type
safety is an important policy because it guarantees that all well-typed programs will behave
in well-defined ways. Type checkers that enforce type safety statically only permit well-typed
programs to execute. On the other hand, dynamic type checkers enforce type safety during
a program’s execution and only permit well-typed program statements, or expressions, to
execute. Therefore, dynamic type checkers do not explicitly guarantee that whole programs
are type safe before their execution, but rather that program sub-expressions, observed up-to
the currently executing sub-expression, are type safe. Although some policies, such as type
safety, can be enforced either statically or dynamically, there are important trade-offs that
exist between static and dynamic enforcement.
Static mechanisms (e.g., static type checkers or virus scanners) analyze all of a program’s source [28], intermediate (e.g., [42, 26]), or binary code (e.g., [19, 56]) before its
execution. Such mechanisms allow policy violations to be caught before code is put into
production without inhibiting a program’s runtime performance. However, it is undecidable
to determine statically whether an arbitrary program satisfies a nontrivial policy [80, 89,
p. 219]. Consequently, static code analyzers typically enforce policies conservatively and
sometimes report false positives [28]. This problem prevents many developers and security
practitioners from using static code analyzers due to the onerous task of figuring out which
reports are actually a policy violation [52]. Other static code analyzers aim to reduce the
burden on the developer of having to manually verify which reports are false positives by
2

being more precise (e.g., [99, 87]); however, this approach often comes with introducing false
negatives, which provides no guarantees that code is free from vulnerabilities [28].
Dynamic, or runtime, mechanisms monitor program events during a program’s execution and intervene as necessary. For example, web browsers may prevent unsafe JavaScript
functions, such as eval, from executing [67], mobile-based enforcement mechanisms may
prevent unauthorized use of location-based services [69], and operating systems may limit,
or prevent entirely, the use of particular system resources based on user privilege levels.
These mechanisms can enforce some policies more precisely than static mechanisms because
of available runtime information, but generally sacrifice runtime performance for precision.
Hybrid mechanisms combine a static and dynamic approach to policy enforcement
and can enforce policies that are difficult to enforce by just a static or dynamic mechanism
alone. For example, many information flow control mechanisms combine static and dynamic
enforcement (e.g., [82, 83, 20]), such as a static type checker and a runtime monitor to prevent
public outputs from revealing information about secret inputs. Some program rewriters—
mechanisms that modify programs prior to their execution to ensure policy satisfaction [46]—
can be viewed as a particular type of hybrid that is able to perform static code analysis
and inline checks to enforce policy-specific constraints at runtime for statically undecidable
policies.
The static-dynamic view of security mechanisms is important for providing a foundation for characterizing the class of policies enforceable by both static and dynamic mechanisms. However, this perspective presents a problem in addressing two open, foundational
research questions in computer security:
1. Which policies are precisely enforceable by hybrid mechanisms? To precisely show the
class of policies enforceable by hybrid mechanisms, one must be able to present a rigorous proof of the types of policies enforceable by the mechanism as a whole. However,
a precise characterization of the class of policies enforceable by hybrid mechanisms has
3

been difficult to derive because different proof techniques are used for the static and
dynamic components [82].
2. Do additional mechanisms exist, beyond: static code analyzers, runtime mechanisms,
and hybrids? Research has shown that, given the necessary capabilities, some security
mechanisms can enforce policies that other mechanisms cannot (e.g., [61, 62, 33]), which
raises the question of whether additional mechanisms exist that can enforce even larger
classes of security policies.
A first step to answering these questions might be to reason about security mechanisms
more uniformly by casting existing mechanisms into a single framework. A holistic view
of security mechanisms and policies might help us to better understand the capabilities
of various security enforcement mechanisms and provide a better understanding of how
arbitrary mechanisms, including hybrids, may enforce policies in practice.
This dissertation thus introduces an alternative perspective for classifying security
mechanisms based on the granularity of code that they monitor.

1.1

Contributions
The main contributions of this dissertation are twofold: (1) we present a unifying

theory of security enforcement mechanisms by encoding existing mechanisms as runtime
mechanisms that operate at one or more levels of program code granularity, and (2) we
demonstrate the practicality of the theory with an implementation of a framework for enforcing security policies at various levels of code granularity on Java bytecode applications.
The unifying theory has allowed us to identify new kinds of runtime security mechanisms capable of operating at various levels of code granularity, and develop a new taxonomy
of security policies that can aid in determining how particular security policies might be enforced on untrusted programs. The implementation hinges on an extensible Java library,
4

called JaBRO, that we have developed to enable runtime code analysis at several levels of
code granularity on Java bytecode applications. JaBRO enables certain security policies
conservatively enforced by static mechanisms to be enforced more precisely at runtime.

1.2

Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows:

1. Chapter 2 discusses background and related work on formal frameworks and security
mechanisms. Section 2.1 discusses how formal frameworks have been used to reason
about security policies over systems and presents formal definitions for security policies.
Section 2.2 discusses existing classes of security mechanisms and shows how there does
not exist a unified framework capable of capturing all security mechanisms.
2. Chapter 3 introduces the first contribution of this dissertation, a unified model of security mechanisms parameterized by the granularity of program code that mechanisms
monitor. This chapter shows how this model unifies existing classes of security mechanisms and presents a new taxonomy of security policies. Additionally, this chapter
gives several example security policies and shows how they can be encoded at various
levels of code granularity.
3. Chapter 4 presents a practical example of how forward secrecy, a desirable property of
authentication methods, can be enforced at a fine-grained level on a variant protocol
of an authentication method called Coauthentication [63].
4. Chapter 5 presents the second contribution of this dissertation, an implementation of
the unified framework that enables security policies to be enforced on Java bytecode
applications at various levels of code granularity. The chapter shows how the precision

5

and effectiveness of the framework depends on an extensible Java library, called JaBRO,
that we have developed to enable runtime code analysis on Java bytecode applications.
5. Chapter 6 presents details about the evaluation of the implementation and shows how
we evaluated the effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation by enforcing security
policies at various levels of code granualrity on two popular, open-source Java bytecode
applications.
6. Chapter 7 concludes with a summary of the contributions of this dissertation and
provides directions for future work.
Parts of the text presented in this dissertation have appeared in two published conference papers [63, 36]. Permission to use material from the aforementioned papers are
presented in Appendix A.

6

Chapter 2: Background and Related Works

This chapter discusses prior work on formal frameworks for reasoning about security
policies and mechanisms. Section 2.1 describes two categories of formal frameworks that
have been used in computer security to reason about systems, their executions, and policies expressed over such systems. This section also presents formal definitions of policies,
properties, safety, and liveness that will be used throughout this dissertation. Section 2.2
discusses existing classes of security mechanisms and shows how there does not exist a unified
framework to reason about all such mechanisms.

2.1

Formal Frameworks
Formal frameworks are used to specify and reason about security policies over systems.

A system can be modeled as a set of executions, and policies can be expressed as sets of
valid systems.
Formal frameworks for security can be categorized as either system centric or mechanism centric. System-centric frameworks reason about systems as monolithic units that
execute events (e.g., [77, 86, 40]), whereas mechanism-centric frameworks reason about systems as a composition of distinct components, such as an untrusted program, a security
mechanism, and an underlying executing system, each of which can exhibit events [61].
This section focuses on general-purpose, automata-theoretic frameworks (e.g., [86, 61,
62, 79, 33]) that encode system executions as sets of traces, where each trace represents a
single run of a system.

7
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Figure 2.1. State machine model of a system.
2.1.1 System-Centric Frameworks
System-centric frameworks model systems as state machines that transition between
states by executing events, as shown in Figure 2.1. There are two ways to encode the executions of systems under a system-centric view: 1) as sequences of states, or 2) as sequences of
observable events (i.e., events executed by the system). Policies over such systems are sets
of valid system executions.
States encode the condition of the system at each step of its computation (e.g., variable values) [57, 5]. This formalism began with research in program verification, where the
objective was to ensure that systems remained in acceptable states at each step of their
computation. Given a policy, encoded as a set of valid executions, it is possible to prove
that the policy holds for a particular system if it can be shown that the set of executions
describing the system is contained in the policy.
System-centric, event-based traces are encoded as sequences of events executed by
systems during their computation (e.g., [62]). This model is sometimes used in security
research because it is not only important to ensure that systems remain in acceptable states
at each step of their computation, but also to ensure that systems only execute valid events
to reach acceptable states. Event-based traces can be more expressive than state-based
traces because a system may execute several, possibly different, events before transitioning
between states. Due to this added expressiveness, this dissertation will only present formal
notation for system-centric, event-based traces.
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Let E, ranged over by metavariable e, denote the set of all possible system events. A
system execution, or trace, x is a finite or infinite sequence of such events (e.g., e1 , e2 , e3 ...).
Let E ∗ denote the set of all possible finite-length traces, E ω denote the set of all possible
infinite-length traces, and E ∞ denote the set of all possible traces (i.e., E ∗ ∪ E ω ). A trace
x ∈ E ∗ that is a prefix of trace y ∈ E ∞ is denoted by x  y; conversely, a trace y that
extends trace x is denoted by y  x. The empty trace (i.e., a trace containing 0 events) is
notated as ε and | x | denotes the size of a trace x (i.e., the number of events appearing in
x).
System-centric policies only encode, what are called, observable events [17]. Observable events are events that are actually executed by the system and cause the system to take
a computational step. Events attempted by an untrusted program that are prevented from
executing by a security mechanism are considered unobservable events and do not appear on
system traces. For example, consider a policy that states “classified data must not be sent
over unsecured networks”. If a program attempts to send classified data over an unsecured
network but is prevented from doing so by a security mechanism, the interaction between the
security mechanism and the program is not described by the system-centric policy because
this interaction is considered to be unobservable. Therefore, this model makes it difficult to
reason about the effects of security mechanisms on untrusted programs when mechanisms
must remedy invalid program events.

2.1.2 Mechanism-Centric Frameworks
Mechanism-centric frameworks encode system executions as sequences of pairs of
events, where each pair is called an exchange [33, 79]. The first event in each pair is an event
attempted by a component of the system, and the second event in each pair is an event
actually executed by the system or an observable event that may be returned by the system.
Systems in this framework are modeled as state transducers that transition between states
9

<e,e>
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<e’,e’>
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Figure 2.2. State transducer model of a system.
based on exchanges, as shown in Figure 2.2. The ability to distinguish between attempted
and executed events is important because policies expressed over such systems can describe
the effects of security mechanisms and how they might remedy potentially invalid program
events.
Formally, as shown in [79], E denotes the set of possible system events and determines
E the set of possible exchanges, where an exchange can be any pair of events from E. A
trace x is a finite or infinite sequence of exchanges (e.g.,he0 , e00 ihe1 , e01 i . . .). The events in an
exchange may not be equal. For example, when a system attempts to execute an event e that
violates a policy, a security mechanism may output an alternative event e0 that satisfies the
policy instead; the resulting exchange is he, e0 i. The set of all finite-length traces is denoted
by E ∗ , the set of all infinite-length traces is denoted by E ω , and the set of all possible traces
is denoted by E ∞ (i.e., E ∗ ∪ E ω ). Similar to system-centric trace models, x  y denotes that
trace x ∈ E ∗ is a prefix of trace y ∈ E ∞ ; the extension operator  is defined symmetrically.
The empty trace is commonly notated as ε and the size of a trace x is notated as | x | (i.e.,
the number of exchanges in x).

2.1.3 System-Centric vs. Mechanism-Centric Frameworks
System-centric frameworks are more suitable for program verification because systemcentric policies specify only valid system events. System-centric policies therefore specify
what systems should do, or the system events that are allowed to execute, but not how partic-
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Figure 2.3. System-centric policy: no FileWriter.write() after FileReader.read().
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Figure 2.4. Mechanism-centric policy: no FileWriter.write() after FileReader.read().
ular systems can be made to satisfy such policies when they deviate from a particular policy’s
behaviors. Consequently, system-centric frameworks do not inherently provide the capability
to reason about the effects of security mechanisms on untrusted programs. For example, consider the policy described in Figure 2.3; this policy stipulates that FileWriter.write() cannot occur after FileReader.read() has occured. Suppose an untrusted program attempts
to execute FileWriter.write() while in state qf r —meaning that a FileReader.read()
has already occurred—a mechanism enforcing the policy by simulating execution according
to the state machine in Figure 2.3 cannot make a transition on FileWriter.write() while
in state qf r , thereby making it difficult to determine a suitable response to the attempted
policy violation.
Mechanism-centric frameworks are more suitable for reasoning about the enforcement
of policies on untrusted programs. Mechanism-centric policies encode not only valid events
but how invalid events may be transformed into valid events. In other words, mechanismcentric policies describe not only the events allowed by the policy but also the effects of
security mechanisms when programs deviate from the behaviors allowed by the policy.
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For example, consider the mechanism-centric version of the “no FileWriter.write() after FileReader.read()” policy described in Figure 2.4. While in state qf r an untrusted
program can attempt any event, indicated by e; however, only an event that is not a
FileWriter.write(), indicated by e000 can actually be executed.

Therefore, even if a

program attempts a FileWriter.write() while in state qf r , it is clear that a mechanism can respond to this attempted policy violation by outputting any event that is not
a FileWriter.write() event. Next, we will present formal definitions for system-centric
and mechanism-centric policies, properties, safety, and liveness.

2.1.4 Policies
Security policies specify constraints on system behaviors and can be defined qualitatively or quantitatively. Qualitative security policies, also known as “black-and-white”
policies [79], are predicates over sets of system traces. A qualitative policy distinguishes between secure and insecure systems. Quantitative policies, also known as “gray” policies [79],
are functions over sets of system traces. Rather than specifying what makes a system secure
or insecure, qualitative policies determine how secure systems are. For example, consider the
policy that states “all resources acquired must eventually be released”, if a system does not
release one particular resource but releases all other acquired resources, a qualitative version
of such a policy will consider this system to be insecure. However, a quantitative version of
such policy might consider the system to be, say, 90% secure, assuming the policy decreases
the security of the system by 10% for each unreleased resource. This dissertation will only
present formal definitions for qualitative security policies.
Formally, a system-centric policy P is a predicate P : 2E

∞

→ {true, f alse} over

systems, where a system is encoded as a set of executions, or traces, X ⊆ E ∞ . A policy can
∞

also be encoded as a set of valid systems: P ⊆ 2E .
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A mechanism-centric policy P is also a predicate P : 2E

∞

→ {true, f alse} over

systems [86]. However, as shown in Section 2.1.2, a mechanism-centric trace is a sequence
of exchanges rather than a sequence of events. Therefore, a system’s set of traces, under the
mechanism-centric view encodes the original, possibly invalid, events of the target system,
encoded as the first event of every exchange, and the valid events of the system, encoded as
the second event in every exchange. A mechanism-centric system is therefore modeled as a
∞

set of traces X ⊆ E ∞ , so a policy can also be encoded as a set of valid systems: P ⊆ 2E .
Another term for policies is hyperproperties [32]. The term “hyperproperties” is
used to distinguish between policies that may require relationships to hold between different
executions of a system and policies that hold for individual executions of a system, termed
“properties”. An example hyperproperty that is not a property is a policy stipulating a bound
on a system’s average response time to requests [32]. To verify whether this hyperproperty
holds for a particular system, all of a system’s executions must be examined to ensure that
the system’s average response time is less than or equal to the specified bound. The term
“property” is formally defined next in Section 2.1.5.

2.1.5 Properties
Properties are policies that stipulate constraints on individual executions of a system [32]. These type of policies can only atomically reason about a single trace and cannot
specify relationships between different traces of a system, like the average response time hyperproperty described previously in Section 2.1.4. Therefore, properties are predicates over
individual executions. A property is said to hold for a system if the property holds for each
individual execution of the system.
Formally, a system-centric policy P is a system-centric property iff
∃p̂ : E ∞ → {true, f alse} : ∀X ⊆ E ∞ : P (X) ⇐⇒ (∀x ∈ X : p̂(x)).
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Because properties are boolean predicates over executions, they can also be formally
defined as a set of valid executions. Formally, a system-centric policy P is a property iff
∃p̂ ⊆ E ∞ : ∀X ⊆ E ∞ : (X ∈ P ⇐⇒ (∀x ∈ X : x ∈ p̂)).
Similarly, a mechanism-centric policy P is a mechanism-centric property iff
∃p̂ : E ∞ → {f alse, true} : ∀X ⊆ E ∞ : (P (X) ⇐⇒ (∀x ∈ X : p̂(x))),
and a mechanism-centric policy P is a property, described as a set of executions, iff
∃p̂ ⊆ E ∞ : ∀X ⊆ E ∞ : (X ∈ P ⇐⇒ (∀x ∈ X : x ∈ p̂)).
It is important to distinguish between policies that are properties and policies that
are not properties because it determines what kind of security mechanism can be used to
enforce such policy. Dynamic mechanisms that only have access to the current execution can
only enforce properties whereas static mechanisms can approximate all possible executions of
a program by examining its code and therefore can enforce some policies, or hyperproperties,
that are not properties.
Every property can be encoded as an equivalent hyperproperty [32]. Because a property can be encoded as a set of traces p̂ ⊆ E ∞ , or p̂ ⊆ E ∞ for mechanism-centric properties,
the equivalent hyperproperty can be encoded as the powerset of p̂. That is, the equivalent
system-centric hyperproperty of p̂ is P = 2p̂ ; the mechanism-centric hyperproperty can be
defined analogously.

2.1.6 Safety
Policies can be further categorized into safety and liveness policies. A safety policy
that is not a property is called a safety hyperproperty, or hypersafety, and a safety policy
that is a property is called a safety property [32].
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Safety policies are specifications that disallow invalid program behaviors from occurring during a system’s execution, meaning that every event or exchange appearing in an
execution must be deemed valid. Once an invalid event or exchange occurs, the system is
deemed irremediably insecure, meaning that there is no system event or exchange that can
appear after the invalid event or exchange that will return the system to a secure state.
In order to formally define hypersafety, we first define two new operators, as they
are formally defined in [79]: 1) v and 2) w. The v and w operators are defined similarly to the  and  operators, except where  and  are the prefix and extension operators, respectively, for a single trace, the v and w operators are prefix and extension
operators, respectively, for a set of traces. Formally, given X, X 0 ⊆ E ∞ or X, X 0 ⊆ E ∞ ,
X 0 v X =⇒ ∀x0 ∈ X 0 : ∃x ∈ X : x0  x. Therefore, a system-centric policy P is hypersafety iff
∀X ⊆ E ∞ : (X ∈ P ⇐⇒ (∀X 0 v X : X 0 ∈ P )),
and a system-centric policy P is a system-centric safety property p̂ iff
∀x ∈ E ∞ : (x ∈ p̂ ⇐⇒ (∀x0  x : x0 ∈ p̂)).
Similarly, a mechanism-centric policy P is hypersafety iff
∀X ⊆ E ∞ : (X ∈ P ⇐⇒ (∀X 0 v X : X 0 ∈ P )),
and a mechanism-centric policy P is a mechanism-centric safety property p̂ iff
∀x ∈ E ∞ : (x ∈ p̂ ⇐⇒ (∀x0  x : x0 ∈ p̂)).
Note that system-centric safety policies require every event in a trace to be valid, whereas
mechanism-centric safety policies require every exchange to be valid. Therefore, although the
target system may attempt an invalid event, which would be the first event in an exchange,
if a security mechanism transforms the invalid event to a valid event, which would be the
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second event in the exchange, the overall exchange is considered to be valid, thus illustrating
how mechanism-centric policies allow security practitioners to reason about how policies may
be enforced in practice.

2.1.7 Liveness
Liveness policies differ from safety policies in that they allow every finite, insecure
trace to become secure by extending the trace with a valid extension. A liveness policy that
is not a property is called a liveness hyperproperty, or hyperliveness, and a liveness policy
that is a property is called a liveness property [32]. Formally, a system-centric policy P is
hyperliveness iff
∀X ⊆ E ∗ : ∃Y ⊆ E ∞ : (Y w X ∧ Y ∈ P ),
and a system-centric policy P is a system-centric liveness property p̂ iff
∀x ∈ E ∗ : ∃y ∈ E ∞ : (y  x ∧ y ∈ p̂).
Similarly, a mechanism-centric policy P is hyperliveness iff
∀X ⊆ E ∗ : ∃Y ⊆ E ∞ : (Y w X ∧ Y ∈ P ),
and a mechanism-centric policy P is a mechanism-centric liveness property p̂ iff
∀x ∈ E ∗ : ∃y ∈ E ∞ : (y  x ∧ y ∈ p̂).
From these definitions, we can see that liveness policies can be satisfied in infinite
time. For example, consider the nontermination policy stating that systems should not
terminate. Every terminating system that violates this policy can be extended to satisfy the
policy by extending every finite-length trace with an infinite-length trace.
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Figure 2.5. Taxonomy of security policies in prior work.
2.1.8 Summary
Figure 2.5 illustrates the taxonomy of security policies discussed in this section. The
figure shows that hyperproperties encapsulate all possible policies, while properties are a
subclass of the hyperproperties. Therefore, every property is a hyperproperty but every
hyperproperty is not a property. Furthermore, as discussed, properties and hyperproperties
can be further categorized as safety or liveness properties, or hypersafety or hyperliveness,
respectively. Notice that there are policies that are neither safety or liveness, these policies
are called nonsafety, nonliveness properties or nonsafety, nonliveness hyperproperties. Prior
work has shown that every nonsafety, nonliveness policy is the intersection of a safety and a
liveness policy [5, 32].

2.2

Mechanisms
This section reviews existing classes of security mechanisms and shows how formal

frameworks have been used to reason about the class of policies enforceable by such mecha17

nisms. This section also reviews work on practical implementations of security mechanisms.
This review will show that there does not exist a single framework capable of modeling all
security mechanisms and the policies enforceable by such mechanisms.

2.2.1 Static Mechanisms
Static mechanisms enforce policies on whole programs before their execution by analyzing the code of such programs and either accept or reject programs within a finite period
of time [46]. If the mechanism accepts the program, then the program is permitted to execute, and if the mechanism rejects the program then the mechanism may output a report
detailing the potential policy violations.
Static mechanisms for security are designed to catch potential security vulnerabilities
or policy violations before code is put into production. Static mechanisms can be classified
as model checkers or static code analyzers. Model checkers can verify properties of models
of systems; therefore, these tools do not verify properties of concrete system implementations [6]. Consequently, a challenge for security practitioners that use model checkers to
verify properties of models of systems, is verifying whether the model of the system is a correct representation of the actual system. Due to this challenge, this section will only review
prior work on static code analyzers that operate on concrete system implementations.
Static code analyzers are typically used during the development lifecycle of a program.
Therefore, many static code analyzers operate on a program’s source code (e.g., [28, 38, 11]).
However, static code analyzers can also operate on untrusted programs for which source code
is not available by analyzing programs’ intermediate (e.g., [64, 8, 21, 42, 26]) or binary code
(e.g., [19, 56, 91]). The enforcement of security policies statically is an attractive option
because static code analyzers do not significantly impact a program’s runtime performance.
However, the problem of determining statically whether an arbitrary program adheres to
a nontrivial policy is undecidable [80]. Therefore, engineers of static code analyzers are
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forced to implement them to enforce security policies imprecisely. Many static code analyzers enforce policies conservatively (also known as soundly) to ensure that no potential
policy violations go undetected. However, enforcing security policies conservatively leads to
false positives [28], requiring developers to sift through potentially large amounts of code to
determine whether the reports of the analyzer are actually policy violations, which can be
burdensome and result in many developers forgoing static analysis and releasing potentially
vulnerable code.
Some static code analyzers aim to increase usability and reduce the number of false
positives reported by being less sound (e.g., [99, 87]). These tools aim to only report vulnerabilities that can be decided to actually be policy violations. However, such tools often
introduce false negatives, which may be considered dangerous as opposed to conservative
static code analyzers.
Rice’s theorem [80] provides a foundation for the class of policies enforceable by static
code analyzers. That is, any nontrivial policy cannot be precisely enforced by a static code
analyzer. However, research has shown that approximations of nontrivial policies can be
enforced by static code analyzers. For example, rather than enforcing a policy stipulating
that all programs must terminate, a static code analyzer can determine whether a program
will terminate within some finite, specified number n of computational steps by simulating
the program for n computational steps [46]. The static code analyzer will therefore reject
all programs that it can simulate for n + 1 steps.
To formally define the class of policies enforceable by static code analyzers, Hamlen et
al. [46] model security mechanisms as Turing machines and untrusted programs as program
machines, which are deterministic Turing machines that operate over 3 infinite-length tapes.
The class of policies enforceable by static code analyzers is formally defined in [46] with
respect to classes from complexity theory; [46] applies Rice’s theorem to state that only
the class of recursively decidable policies of program machines are enforceable by static
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code analyzers. For every recursively decidable policy P there exists a total, computable
function f that can take as input a Turing machine M and decide within a finite period of
time whether M satisfies P . If for any policy P , f does not exist then P is not statically
enforceable.
Other static enforcement models have employed a functional model of computation
in a variant of the lambda calculus (e.g., [98, 15]) or a security-typed language (e.g., [85,
90, 81, 84, 94, 13, 97, 50, 98, 3, 2, 95]) to express the possible terms, or expressions, of
a programming language (syntax) and how such terms should be evaluated (semantics).
After defining a language’s syntax and semantics, typing rules can be formally defined by
a set of inference rules, which allows one to determine statically whether every terminating
expression of a program will evaluate to a well-defined value with a well-defined type [74].
The static security mechanism in this case is modeled by the rules of the type system.

2.2.2 Dynamic Mechanisms
Dynamic mechanisms enforce policies by monitoring programs during their execution
and intervening when necessary. Due to available runtime information, dynamic mechanisms
can enforce some policies more precisely than static mechanisms; however, the precision at
which policies can be enforced may depend on the capabilities of the dynamic security
mechanism.
To understand the capabilities of various dynamic mechanisms, they are generally
modeled as security automata consisting of countably many states that operate over a countable alphabet and transition between states via a well-defined transition function. Formally,
a dynamic mechanism can be modeled as an automaton M = (Q, Q0 , E, δ) such that
1. Q is a countable set of states,
2. Q0 ⊆ Q is a countable set of initial states,
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3. E is event set over which M operates, and
4. δ is either a deterministic or nondeterministic transition function that has generally
been defined in one of four ways:
(a) δ : Q × E → Q,
(b) δ : Q × E → 2Q ,
(c) δ : Q × E → Q × E, or
(d) δ : Q × E → 2Q×E .
Mechanisms whose transition functions are δ : Q × E → Q or δ : Q × E → 2Q
are called deterministic or nondeterministic execution recognizers, respectively. Mechanisms
whose transition functions are δ : Q × E → Q × E or δ : Q × E → 2Q×E are called
deterministic or nondeterministic execution transformers, respectively [61, 17].
Execution recognizers enforce policies by recognizing invalid executions and halting
the program, or target system, under consideration. Schneider [86] introduced such recognizers, called Execution Monitors (EMs), as a class of dynamic security mechanisms that
can only monitor target system events as they are attempted by the target system. That is,
EMs have no knowledge of future events that might be exhibited by the target system. Furthermore, EMs can only respond to policy violations by halting the target system. Schneider
showed that under this definition, EMs can only enforce a subclass of the safety properties.
EMs cannot enforce all safety properties because mechanisms may not have sufficient power
to prevent the violation of some safety properties. For example, EMs cannot stop the passage
of time. Later work considers such uncontrollable, also called unsupressable events, as clock
ticks [16, 33, 75].
In particular, Basin et al. [16] extended Schneider’s work by distinguishing between
controllable and uncontrollable events. Controllable events are events that security mecha21

nisms can control whereas uncontrollable events can only be observed by mechanisms but
not controlled. Safety properties that depend on uncontrollable events (e.g., clock ticks)
cannot be precisely enforced by EMs.
Execution transformers have the ability to not only recognize an invalid execution
but to transform an invalid execution into a valid one. Ligatti et al. [61] introduced such
transformers as Edit Automata, a class of dynamic security mechanisms that can monitor
events as they are attempted by the target system and have the ability to transform system
executions by inserting or suppressing events as necessary. With these added capabilities,
it is important to constrain the behaviors of security mechanisms to prevent them from
transforming executions in arbitrary ways. Ligatti et al. [61] introduced three definitions
that describe how an edit automaton can enforce policies: 1) conservative enforcement,
2) precise enforcement, and 3) effective enforcement.
An edit automaton conservatively enforces a security policy if the sequence of mechanism outputs is in the set of executions allowed by the policy. This definition allows mechanisms to completely ignore target system inputs and always output executions that will
satisfy the policy. An edit automaton precisely enforces a security policy if the automaton
conservatively enforces the policy and preserves the syntax of target system executions that
already obey the policy in question. That is, if a target system’s execution already satisfies the policy, then the mechanism must output a syntactically equal execution. An edit
automaton effectively enforces a security policy if it: 1) conservatively enforces a security
policy, and 2) preserves the semantics of valid executions. That is, if a target system’s execution already satisfies the policy then the mechanism must output a semantically equivalent
execution, that may not necessarily be syntactically equal.
Given these definitions of enforcement, [61] shows that edit automata can precisely
enforce safety and some nonsafety properties, and can effectively enforce any property, depending on the definition of semantic equivalence. This result is particularly interesting
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for liveness properties because such properties require a mechanism to have knowledge of
possible future events of an execution. While edit automata do not have direct knowledge
about the future of systems’ executions, they do have the ability to buffer events for arbitrary amounts of time. As a result, edit automata can observe arbitrarily long sequences
of system events while simultaneously buffering them and delaying their execution, once an
event satisfying a liveness property occurs, then the automaton can release the sequence of
buffered events to execute. However, this capability may be considered unrealistic in many
situations. Alternatively, an edit automaton can prematurely insert an event, or sequence
of events, that satisfy a liveness property. Then, if the target system exhibits the event, or
sequence of events, satisfying the liveness property, the mechanism can quietly suppress the
event(s) because it already output the event(s) satisfying the liveness property.
The formal framework presented in [61] models dynamic mechanisms as execution
transformers but model policies in a system-centric way, which requires the hardcoded definitions of conservative, precise, and effective enforcement because system traces are not
expressive enough to capture such definitions as a part of the system trace.
Dolzhenko et al. [33] introduced another class of execution transformers as Mandatory
Results Automata (MRAs). These mechanisms have the ability to recognize and transform
not only events exhibited by target programs but also results that might be returned to
target programs by the underlying executing system. MRAs can only process a single event
at a time. That is, for every event input to the mechanism, the mechanism must produce
an output before receiving another input event. A novel feature of MRAs is that they are
able to enforce, what [33] calls, result sanitization policies. Such policies may require a
mechanism to sanitize results returned by an underlying executing system before the results
can be successfully returned to the target system. For example, a policy may require secret
contents of a directory to be hidden from users when they execute the ls command. When
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the results for the contents of the directory are returned, a mechanism might filter out secret
files before displaying the contents of the directory.
Dolzhenko et al. [33] gives three definitions for how MRAs may enforce security policies. They can enforce properties soundly, completely, and precisely. In this framework,
properties are encoded in a mechanism-centric way; therefore, properties can take into consideration the effects of security mechanisms on system events. An MRA soundly enforces
a property p̂ if the set of executions of the MRA is a subset of the executions describing
the property p̂. That is, the MRA only produces executions that satisfy p̂. An MRA completely enforces a policy if the set of executions of the MRA is a superset of the executions
of the property p̂. That is, every valid execution described by the property p̂ is an execution
produced by the MRA. Lastly, an MRA precisely enforces a security property if the set
of executions describing the MRA equals the set of executions describing the property p̂.
It is shown that deterministic MRAs precisely enforce a proper subset of the mechanismcentric safety properties while nondeterministic MRAs precisely enforce a proper superset
of the mechanism-centric safety properties. Determinsitic MRAs can also enforce some
mechanism-centric nonsafety properties by assuming that the underlying executing system
will always return events for particular system events; [33] argues that such an assumption is
often reasonable and can be seen in practical systems such as CPUs and operating systems
that always return a result for particular system events.
Stream Monitoring Automata (SMAs) were introduced in [72]. These mechanisms
are execution transformers that operate over infinite sequences of events. The novel feature
of these mechanisms is that they are not input enabled. Previous models of mechanisms
assumed that mechanisms only output events when provided an input event; [72] gives
several practical examples where it is desirable for mechanisms to output events even in
the absence of input events. It is shown that, with the capability to output events in the
absence of input events, SMAs can enforce some nonsafety properties. The framework used
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to reason about policies enforceable by SMAs was a mechanism-centric framework. Due
to the expressiveness of the framework, [72] shows that constraints placed on SMAs can
be encoded as metapolicies. Metapolicies are defined as policies that place constraints on
other policies. A popular constraint of security mechanisms is that they enforce policies
transparently. Transparency means that if a target system’s execution already satisfies the
policy in question, then the mechanism should not modify the execution in any observable
way. Transparency can be encoded as a metapolicy by requiring the input and output events
of exchanges to be equal when the input event is considered to be a valid event.
Nonuniform runtime mechanisms were introduced in [62]. Nonuniform runtime mechanisms have auxiliary knowledge about programs’ executions, such as the results of a static
code analyzer that guarantees whether certain program events will occur. Formal characterizations of the class of policies enforceable by nonuniform runtime mechanisms with various
capabilities were presented in [27, 65, 76]. It was shown that nonuniform runtime mechanisms
are capable of enforcing some nonsafety properties, which uniform runtime mechanisms—
mechanisms that only monitor the current execution and have no a priori knowledge about
the program—with the same capabilities cannot enforce. Although nonuniform runtime
mechanisms aim to amplify the enforcement power of runtime mechanisms by giving the
mechanism access to the results of a static code analyzer, this model is not capable of unifying the two enforcement approaches because nonuniform runtime mechanisms do not have
direct access to a program’s code, whereas static code analyzers do.
Models of runtime mechanisms for black-box reactive programs were introduced
in [70]. These mechanisms are execution transformers that have the ability to run additional, isolated copies of a program to examine the difference in program output when given
different inputs. However, it is assumed that mechanisms do not have access to programs’
source or machine code. With the capability to examine how programs respond to different
inputs, these mechanisms were shown to be able to enforce some hypersafety policies. Pre25

vious work on runtime mechanisms only considered them to be able to enforce properties,
since they could only examine the current execution.
Hamlen et al. [46] showed that any statically enforceable policy is enforceable by a
runtime mechanism if the runtime mechanism can perform code analysis immediately after
the program is loaded, illustrating that hyperproperties are indeed enforceable at runtime.
However, [46] did not explore the implications of this claim or whether runtime mechanisms,
capable of performing code analysis, can improve the precision at which some statically
undecidable policies may be enforced.

2.2.3 Hybrid Mechanisms
Hybrid mechanisms enforce policies by combining static code analysis and runtime
monitoring (e.g., [82, 96, 58, 59, 88]). These mechanisms enable some policies to be enforced
that are difficult to enforce by just a static or dynamic mechanism alone.
Many hybrid security mechanisms proposed in the literature are domain specific,
targeting either the web-application or information-flow security domains. For example, [82]
presents a mechanism capable of enforcing certain information-flow security policies that
cannot be enforced by just a static or dynamic mechanism alone, but can be enforced by
combining static code analysis and runtime monitoring.
Russo and Sabelfield [83] show that information-flow policies can be enforced both
soundly and permissively with hybrid mechanisms. Because statically determining whether
an arbitrary program satisfies a policy, in general, is undecidable, detecting information-flow
policy violations statically is not permissive. A sound static analyzer may conservatively
reject programs that do not violate the policy. A purely dynamic mechanism, however, may
not soundly enforce an information-flow policy, if it is unaware of other possible program
executions, but it is more permissive than static analysis due to available runtime informa-

26

tion. Russo and Sabelfied show that the best of both worlds can be achieved by combining
static code analysis and runtime monitoring.
Vogt et al. [96] presented a hybrid mechanism that is able to prevent attackers from
obtaining sensitive user information through cross-site scripting attacks. The mechanism
performs runtime monitoring to ensure that JavaScript programs only send sensitive information to servers from which they originated. Static analysis is used to detect implicit
information flows that may not be able to be detected by the runtime mechanism.
AMNESIA [44] is another hybrid mechanism designed to detect SQL injection attacks.
The mechanism uses static code analysis to obtain a model of valid SQL queries that an
application is allowed to generate. When an application executes, AMNESIA employs a
dynamic mechanism to analyze concrete, dynamically generated SQL queries. These queries
are checked against the statically generated model of valid queries. If the query is valid,
then the query is allowed to proceed; if the query is found to be invalid, then the query is
rejected and reported to security administrators. Several other, similar, hybrid mechanisms
have been proposed for ensuring the security of web applications (e.g., [60, 4, 12, 30]).
The majority of hybrid mechanisms proposed in the literature have been domainspecific mechanisms designed to enforce specific policies. Consequently, frameworks for such
domain-specific mechanisms are not suitable for reasoning about which policies are enforceable by hybrid mechanisms in general.
However, [46] presented a class of policies enforceable by a particular type of hybrid
mechanism called a program rewriter. A program rewriter is a mechanism that is able to
modify a program prior to its execution to ensure that it satisfies a particular policy. Program
rewriters can be seen as purely static mechanisms since they modify programs prior to their
execution; however, they can also be viewed as hybrids when they inline runtime checks to
enforce policy-specific constraints at runtime for statically undecidable policies. Program
rewriters that inline runtime checks for statically undecidable policies implement Inlined
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Reference Monitors (IRMs) [37]. IRMs are popular runtime mechanisms that are embedded
within a program’s code. IRMs provide the capability for enforcing application-specific
policies. Furthermore, IRMs may improve the performance of enforcing policies at runtime
by eliminating context switches between the untrusted code and the security mechanism,
because the mechanism is embedded within the program’s code [47].
Hamlen et al. [46] characterized the class of policies enforceable by program rewriters as the RW≈ −enf orceable policies. A policy P is deemed RW≈ −enf orceable if three
rules can be satisifed: 1) there exists a total, computable rewriting function that inputs
an untrusted program, say X, and outputs a program X 0 , 2) the output program X 0 satisfies P (i.e., P (X 0 )), and 3) if the input program X already satisfies policy P then the
output program X 0 is equivalent to the input program (i.e., P (X) ⇒ X ≡ X 0 ). The
RW≈ −enf orceable policies includes all statically enforceable policies and all of the policies
enforceable by EMs. Although [46] characterizes the class of policies enforceable by program
rewriting as the RW≈ −enf orceable policies, it is stated that the exact class of policies enforceable by program rewriters with respect to known classes from complexity theory could
not be determined, and might not exist, as no known class of the arithmetic hierarchy is
equivalent to the class of RW≈ −enf orceable policies.
2.2.4 Aspect-Oriented Policy-Specification Languages
Policy-specification languages are designed to aid policy writers in correctly specifying security policies. Policy-specification languages are important because specifying policies
correctly can be an error prone and tedious process. Such languages can provide guarantees
to the policy writer that the specification actually implements the policy that the policy
writer intended through the language’s type system and formal verification techniques [45].
This section reviews aspect-oriented policy-specification languages designed for policy enforcement by runtime monitoring. We do not review policy-specification languages designed
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for policy enforcement by static code analysis due to the undecidability of statically determining whether an arbitrary program satisfies a policy; therefore, such languages are not
powerful enough to synthesize security mechanisms capable of enforcing nontrivial security
policies.
A common way to specify security policies is by implementing them as aspects [53].
Aspects allow policy writers to implement security policies in a modular fashion so as to
make them easier to reason about and verify the correctness of their implementations.
Aspect-oriented programming is a programming paradigm that modularizes cross-cutting
concerns [55]. A cross-cutting concern is a concern that is spread throughout several modules of a system. For example, consider a security policy that places stipulations on which
files can be accessed by untrusted programs. A program may execute several file operations,
spread throughout several modules of its implementation. To ensure that the policy is not
violated, every file operation must be verified to satisfy the security policy. Implementing the
policy for every single file operation can be tedious and error prone; however, aspect-oriented
programming languages provide a way for security policies to be specified in a centralized,
modular way.
Security Policy XML (SPoX) [45] is a declarative policy-specification language designed for enforcement by Inlined Reference Monitors (IRMs) that implement execution
monitors [86] on Java bytecode applications. It is an aspect-oriented language based on a
system-centric view of security policies. That is, the language is capable of specifying what
the policy is but not how the policy should be enforced; [45] argues that imperative code
fragments that specify how a policy should be enforced are difficult to reason about and can
be error prone.
Polymer [18] is an imperative policy-specification language designed for enforcement
by IRMs that implement edit automata [61] on Java bytecode applications. Polymer allows
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policy writers to specify how policy violations should be handled through the query method
construct that returns suggestions on how to handle security-relevant events.
Policy Enforcement Toolkit (PoET) and Policy Specification Language (PSLang) [37]
are a program-rewriting system and a policy-specification language for implementing security
policies for enforcement by IRMs on Java bytecode applications. They are used to implement
Java’s stack inspection security policy. Naccio [39] is another system designed for specifying
safety properties enforceable by IRMs on Java bytecode applications and Win32 executables.
ConScript [67] is a system designed for enforcing security policies via IRMs on
JavaScript code in the browser. ConScript policies can be generated automatically through
static and dynamic code analysis, which eliminates the need for policies to be developed
manually by policy writers.
Several other aspect-oriented policy-specification languages exist (e.g., [10, 49, 9, 48,
51]); however, such languages synthesize runtime monitors that have only been shown to
be capable of monitoring security-relevant program events as they are attempted by target
programs. Policies that are not properties and liveness properties require mechanisms to
be aware of other possible executions, or the possible future events of an execution, respectively. However, as far as we are aware, there does not exist a general policy-specification
language capable of synthesizing runtime mechanisms that can enforce all kinds of policies
(i.e., hyperproperties, properties, safety, and liveness).

2.2.5 Summary
This section has shown that there exist several models of security mechanisms, with
various capabilities, that help us to understand the class of policies enforceable by such
mechanisms. Such models are important for understanding what types of policies we can
expect security mechanisms to enforce in practice. However, as far as we are aware, no model
proposed in the literature has been shown to capture all kinds of security mechanisms, which
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makes it difficult to answer the question of whether additional sorts of mechanisms, capable
of enforcing an even larger class of security policies, exist.
Hybrid mechanisms have been shown to enforce policies that are difficult to enforce by
just a static or dynamic mechanism alone (e.g., [82]), but many hybrid mechanisms proposed
in the literature are domain specific, making it difficult to understand the practical limitations of hybrid mechanisms in general. Program rewriters were shown to be a powerful class
of hybrid security mechanisms capable of enforcing all of the statically enforceable policies
and all of the policies enforceable by execution monitors; however, the exact class of policies
enforceable by such mechanisms with respect to known classes from complexity theory is
unknown. A general model capable of capturing arbitrary classes of security mechanisms
might be a first step to determining whether additional classes of security mechanisms exist
and further refining the class of policies enforceable by hybrid mechanisms.
We conclude from prior work that runtime mechanisms can be viewed as generalizations of static mechanisms when runtime mechanisms can access a program’s code. This
conclusion provides a basis for a unified approach to security policy enforcement.
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Chapter 3: A Unified Approach

Security mechanisms are typically categorized as static, dynamic, or hybrid mechanisms. This classification is based on the time at which such mechanisms enforce policies
on untrusted programs. Static mechanisms enforce policies on programs before their execution, dynamic mechanisms enforce policies on programs during their execution, and hybrid
mechanisms enforce policies on programs by using a combination of static and dynamic
enforcement.
While different security mechanisms may differ in the time at which they enforce
security policies— relative to the current execution status of a program—all security mechanisms enforce policies on some granularity of a program event before its execution, irrespective of the fact that the program as a whole may or may not be currently executing. Static
mechanisms enforce policies on whole programs before their execution, whereas dynamic
mechanisms typically enforce policies on program instructions, or statements, before their
execution. Rather than classifying mechanisms based on when they operate, this dissertation classifies mechanisms based on the granularity of program code that they monitor. This
shift in perspective allows us to cast existing mechanisms into a single framework where all
mechanisms can be encoded as runtime mechanisms that operate at one or more levels of
program code granularity. This chapter presents a unified framework for reasoning about all
security mechanisms and defines levels of granularities at which mechanisms may operate.
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3.1

Granular Program Events and Traces
The framework presented in this chapter is derived from the mechanism-centric, trace-

based framework presented in [33, 79] and in Chapter 2. The main difference is that previous
work considered the event set E to be a set of atomic program events that, when executed,
cause a system to take a computational step, which we call fine-grained events. We extend
prior work by allowing set E to contain fine-, medium-, and coarse-grained events. Let Ec
denote the set of all possible coarse-grained program events, with metavariable ec ranging
over the individual elements of Ec ; Em denotes the set of all possible medium-grained program
events, with metavariable em ranging over the individual elements of Em ; Ef denotes the set
of all possible fine-grained program events, with metavariable ef ranging over the individual
elements of Ef . Therefore, E = Ec ∪ Em ∪ Ef and is ranged over by metavariable e.
Following [33, 79], the event set E determines the set E of possible exchanges, except in this dissertation Ef = {hef , e0 i | ef ∈ Ef } denotes the set of fine-grained exchanges, Em = {hem , e0 i | em ∈ Em } denotes the set of medium-grained exchanges, and
Ec = {hec , e0 i | ec ∈ Ec } denotes the set of coarse-grained exchanges. Note that there are no
stipulations placed on the granularity of e0 in each exchange. These definitions are general
in that they do not limit the granularity of the event that can actually be executed. The set
of all exchanges is denoted by E = Ef ∪ Em ∪ Ec .
The distinction between coarse-, medium-, and fine-grained exchanges allows us to
encode hybrid traces within this framework. A trace is hybrid iff it contains at least two
exchanges that are of different granularities. Such traces capture the functionality of hybrid
mechanisms that combine static and dynamic enforcement by first statically analyzing a
whole program and then dynamically enforcing policy-specific constraints on fine-grained
program instructions.
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Let Ef∗ denote the set of all finite-length, fine-grained traces, Efω denote the set of
infinite-length, fine-grained traces, and Ef∞ = Ef∗ ∪ Efω denote the set of all possible fineω
∗
denote
denote the set of all finite-length, medium-grained traces, Em
grained traces. Let Em
ω
∗
∞
denote the set of
∪ Em
= Em
the set of all infinite-length, medium-grained traces, and Em

all possible medium-grained traces. Let Ec∗ denote the set of all finite-length, coarse-grained
traces, Ecω denote the set of all infinite-length, coarse-grained traces, and Ec∞ = Ec∗ ∪Ecω denote
the set of all possible coarse-grained traces. Let Eh∗ denote the set of all possible finite-length
hybrid traces, Ehω denote the set of all possible infinite-length traces, and Eh∞ = Eh∗ ∪ Ehω
denote the set of all possible hybrid traces.
∗
The set of all possible finite-length traces is denoted by E ∗ = Ef∗ ∪ Em
∪ Ec∗ ∪ Eh∗ , the set
ω
of all infinite-length traces is denoted by E ω = Efω ∪ Em
∪ Ecω ∪ Ehω , and the set of all possible
∞
∪ Ec∞ ∪ Eh∞ . It is important to distinguish between the
traces is denoted by E ∞ = Ef∞ ∪ Em

granularity of program events and traces to ensure that we are able to capture the granularity
of program code that existing classes of static, dynamic, and hybrid mechanisms monitor.

3.2

Mechanisms
All mechanisms presented in this chapter are runtime mechanisms that enforce policies

by intercepting security-relevant events just before they are about to execute. To capture
realistic behaviors of security mechanisms, we model them as automata that can permit,
deny [86], modify [46], suppress, or insert [61] program events based on the rules of a policy.
These capabilities capture the capabilities of existing mechanisms presented in Chapter 2.
Definition 1. A security mechanism is an automaton M = (Q, Q0 , I, O, δ), where
• Q is a countable set of automaton states,
• Q0 ⊆ Q is a countable set of initial automaton states,
• I is the set of possible inputs to the mechanism,
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Figure 3.1. A general security mechanism.

• O is the set of possible outputs from the mechanism, and
• δ is a deterministic or nondeterministic transition function. A deterministic δ is a
function δ : Q × I → Q × O, and a nondeterministic δ is a function δ : Q × I → 2Q×O
It is important to distinguish between deterministic and nondeterministic mechanisms
because there often exist several possible output events for a single input event. For example,
the mechanism can output the input event verbatim, an event to halt the system, or replace
the input event with an entirely new event. This definition is general in that it does not
limit the extent to which mechanisms can transform input events. However, to constrain
mechanisms’ behaviors one can define a deterministic transition function.
An input i ∈ I to or an output o ∈ O from a mechanism can be any well-defined
program construct. For example, Figure 3.1 illustrates how an example Java program is
composed of different granular program constructs. At the coarsest granularity are whole
programs. A whole program can be decomposed into packages, packages can be decomposed
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into classes, classes can be decomposed into methods, and methods can be decomposed into
fine-grained program instructions.

3.3

Fine-Grained Policy Enforcement
A fine-grained policy ranges over fine-grained traces.

Definition 2. A policy Pf is fine grained iff
∞

Pf ⊆ 2Ef .
Definition 3. A property pˆf is fine grained iff
pˆf ⊆ Ef∞ .
For the rest of this dissertation Pf and pˆf will denote that the policy, respectively
property, under consideration is fine grained. As stated in Section 3.1, only the first event
in every exchange is required to be a fine-grained event. In every mechanism-centric trace,
the first event in every exchange is an event attempted by a target system; therefore, the
first event in every exchange is an event that could be monitored by, or input to, a security
mechanism.
Fine-grained events include all atomic program instructions including values contained therein. Instructions might be low-level assembly or micro-code instructions, or highlevel language program statements (e.g., method invocations or assignment statements).
Values can be primitive or reference types or a collection of values stored in a data structure
(e.g., integers, objects, or arrays of values).
Previous work encoded system-centric executions as sequences of atomic events, where
each event is an event executed by the system that causes the system to take a computational
step. Mechanism-centric executions were encoded as sequences of exchanges, where both
events in the exchange are fine-grained events. The first event is an event attempted by
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the target system that might cause it to take a computational step, and the second event is
the event actually executed by the system, causing it to actually take a computational step.
Previous work has shown that all policies can be encoded as fine-grained policies. However,
not all policies are enforceable at such a fine-grained level.
In this framework, a runtime mechanism operates at a fine-grained level if it monitors fine-grained events as they are attempted by the target program. Policies enforceable
at this level do not require mechanisms to access a program’s code. The language monitored by the mechanism determines the granularity for certain types of program events. A
single program statement at the source-code level may consist of several instructions at the
machine-code level. Policies enforceable at a fine-grained level, at the source-code level, may
not be enforceable at a fine-grained level at the machine-code level. For example, consider
again the “no FileWriter.write() after FileReader.read()” policy presented in Chapter 2. FileReader.read() and FileWriter.write() are Java method calls. A runtime
mechanism can enforce this policy at a fine-grained level at either the source or bytecode
level. At the source-code level, a mechanism can directly monitor FileWriter.write() and
FileReader.read() method invocations. At the bytecode level, a mechanism can monitor
java

bytecode

invokevirtual

instructions

for

the

FileWriter.write()

and

FileReader.read() method calls. If a program attempts to execute FileWriter.write()
after executing FileReader.read(), one possible way the mechanism can respond to the attempted policy violation is by outputting System.exit(1) to halt the target program. The
mechanism in this case only monitors the invocations of the read() and write() methods
and does not analyze the code body of these methods. A mechanism enforcing such a policy
in this way, by monitoring individual program statements, operates at a fine-grained level.
Now

consider

a

runtime

mechanism

attempting

to

enforce

the

“no

FileWriter.write() after FileReader.read()” policy at the machine-code level. Such a
mechanism may not be able to enforce this policy at a fine-grained level for at least two rea37

sons: 1) the language-specific abstractions Filewriter.write() and FileReader.read()
may not exist at the machine-code level, and 2) an optimizing compiler may have replaced
all function call and return statements with the code bodies of functions (i.e., inlining), thus
eliminating a monitor’s ability to monitor function calls.
Fine-grained policy enforcement is beneficial when satisfaction of the policy depends on runtime values. For example, consider again the “no FileWriter.write() after
FileReader.read()” policy except programs can now write to files after a file read if and
only if the name of the file being written to is log.txt. Assuming the file name is only
available at runtime, the policy can be enforced at a fine-grained level because a mechanism
only needs to examine the value of the object instance invoking the write method (i.e., the
name of the file bound to the FileWriter object).
Existing mechanisms that operate at this level of granularity include all runtime mechanisms that enforce policies by only monitoring the current fine-grained program execution
and do not access a program’s code. Such mechanisms include execution monitors [86], edit
automata [61], mandatory results automata [33], and stream monitoring automata [72].
Mechanisms operating at this level cannot, in general, precisely enforce hyperproperties [32] that may require relationships to hold between different executions of a program.
This limitation of fine-grained mechanisms exists because such mechanisms have no knowledge of other possible program executions when only monitoring program events as they are
attempted during the current execution.

3.4

Medium-Grained Policy Enforcement
A medium-grained policy ranges over medium-grained traces.

Definition 4. A policy Pm is medium-grained iff
∞

Pm ⊆ 2Em .
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Definition 5. A property pˆm is medium grained iff
∞
.
pˆm ⊆ Em

Henceforth, Pm and pˆm will denote that a policy, respectively property, is medium
grained. Intuitively, medium-grained events exclusively capture all well-defined, modular
language constructs in between fine-grained program statements and whole programs. This
level contains the broadest range of events as different languages contain different constructs.
For example, some medium-grained constructs from the Java programming language include
packages, classes, and methods. More general medium-grained constructs include loops and
conditional statements.
When encoding medium-grained traces, the entire medium-grained construct appears
on the trace because the code body of the construct is considered to be security relevant. For
example, the “no FileWriter.write() after FileReader.read() policy” was shown in Section 3.3 to be enforceable at a fine-grained level because only the invocations of the read and
write methods were considered security relevant; but suppose, additionally, that the policy
placed constraints on events executed within FileWriter.write() and FileReader.read().
For example, the output stream, respectively the input stream, should be closed before the
end of the method’s execution. Ideally, a mechanism should be able to determine whether the
code body of the FileWriter.write() and FileReader.read() methods satisfy the policy
before allowing each method to execute. A mechanism attempting to enforce such a policy at
a fine-grained level may have to let the FileWriter.write() and FileReader.read() methods execute partially until it observes an attempted policy violation. That is, attempting to
return before closing the output (input) stream, at which point the mechanism might either
attempt to correct the execution by inserting an event to close the output (input) stream, if
it has the capability to do so (e.g., [61]), or attempt to roll back the effects of the method’s
partial execution (e.g., [22]). An alternative way to enforce such a policy would be for the
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mechanism to analyze the code body of the FileWriter.write() and FileReader.read()
methods before their execution to ensure that each corresponding method conforms to the
policy at hand.
In practice, a mechanism enforcing a policy at this level of granularity must be able
to intercept execution at a well-defined point in a program’s execution to ensure that the
mechanism can adequately analyze the medium-grained event before its execution. For
example, consider the application-specific policy stating “all resources acquired within an
application-defined method must be released before the end of the method’s execution” [99,
66]. This policy can be enforced at a medium-grained level in the following way:
1. The mechanism can intercept execution at the invocation of every application-defined
method.
2. With access to the program’s code, the mechanism can perform code analysis on the
body of the intercepted method.
3. If the mechanism can determine that every resource acquired within the method is
released before the end of the method’s execution, then the mechanism can allow the
method to proceed to execute. If the mechanism determines that the program will
potentially violate the policy, then the mechanism can enforce the policy in a way
described by the policy writer (e.g., halting the program).
Such a policy is typically enforced by a static code analyzer because it can examine
all possible execution paths and determine if any of the paths may lead to a policy violation.
However, a sound static code analyzer will reject programs that contain both secure and
insecure paths. The benefit of enforcing such a policy at runtime over enforcing it statically
is to more accurately determine the potential execution paths of a program. For example,
consider the following Java method:
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Listing 3.1. An example Java method with an unreleased file resource
1 public void w r i t e S u b S t r i n g ( int index , S t r i n g s ){
2

F i l e W r i t e r w r i t e r = null ;

3

try {

4

w r i t e r = new F i l e W r i t e r (new F i l e ( ” s u b s t r i n g s . t x t ” ) ) ;

5

i f ( i n d e x < 10){

6

S t r i n g newS = s . s u b s t r i n g ( 0 , i n d e x ) ;

7

w r i t e r . w r i t e ( newS ) ;

8

writer . close ( ) ;
} else {

9
10

S t r i n g newS = s . s u b s t r i n g ( i n d e x ) ;

11

w r i t e r . w r i t e ( newS ) ;
}

12
13

} catch ( IOException e ){

14

i f ( w r i t e r != null ){

15

writer . close ( ) ;
}

16
17

}

18 }

This method contains both secure and insecure execution paths, with respect to the
policy stating “resources acquired within an application-defined method must be released
before the end of the method’s execution”. The secure execution path may be taken when
the runtime argument for index is less than 10. The insecure execution path may be taken
when the runtime argument for index is greater than or equal to 10. A sound static analyzer
will take into account all possible executions of this method and report that the FileWriter
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object may not be closed. Assuming that the source code cannot be simply edited, because
it’s not available, the policy may be enforced more precisely at runtime if the mechanism can
determine which branch may be taken by examining the program’s intermediate bytecode,
given the necessary runtime values.
Suppose writeSubString(5,"Hello, World!") is attempted by the program. Knowledge of the runtime values allows a medium-grained mechanism to determine that the if
branch may be taken and, if so, the FileWriter object will be closed; therefore, the method
can proceed to execute. Now assuming writeSubString(10, "Hello, World!") is attempted, the mechanism can then determine that the else branch may be taken and that
the FileWriter object may not be closed. The mechanism can still allow the method to
proceed but, if needed, insert an event to close the FileWriter object just before the method
returns.
Medium-grained policies allow policy writers to take advantage of the modular abstractions of programming languages. Rather than encoding policies as sets of sequences
of fine-grained events, or exchanges, policy writers can reason about some policies more
abstractly by encoding them as sequences of modular events or exchanges. For example,
the “resources acquired within a method must be released before the end of the method’s
execution” property, notated RAA henceforth, places constraints over language-specific abstractions (i.e., methods). RAA can be encoded at a medium-grained level as the set of all
traces containing sequences of valid methods. Let R ⊆ Em be the set of all valid methods
with respect to RAA. One way to encode RAA as a medium-grained property would be
∞
RAAm = {x ∈ Em
| ∀he, e0 i ∈ x : (e ∈ R ⇒ e = e0 ) ∧ e0 ∈ R}.

This policy consists of traces containing sequences of medium-grained exchanges. It
states that, for every exchange in a trace, if the input event is an element of R (i.e., the
input event satisfies the constraint that all resources acquired within a method are released
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before the end of the method’s execution) then the input event is allowed to execute (i.e.,
the output event equals the input event); if the input event is not an element of R (i.e., the
input event does not satisfy the policy constraint) then the input event is not allowed to
execute and an event satisfying the constraint is executed instead (i.e., an event that is an
element of R).
In practice, a runtime monitor may enforce RAAm by intercepting program execution
at all method invocations and perform code analysis on the corresponding method body. If
the monitor can determine whether the method is an element of R, then the monitor can
allow the method to proceed uninterrupted. If the monitor determines that the method is
not an element of R, or if the monitor cannot decide whether the method is an element of R,
perhaps due to control flow that depends on runtime information that cannot be determined
at the time of method invocation, then the monitor can output a default method that satisfies
R.
As discussed in Section 3.3, fine-grained hyperproperties requiring relationships to
hold between different executions of a system cannot, in general, be precisely enforced by
mechanisms that operate at a fine-grained level, because they are unaware of other possible
system executions. On the contrary, some hyperproperties, requiring relationships to hold
between executions of a medium-grained event, can be enforced by mechanisms operating at
a medium-grained level. For example, consider the following method:

Listing 3.2. A Java method with an implicit information flow leak
1
2

public int l e a k ( int g u e s s ){
g u e s s == s e c r e t ? return 0 : return 1 ;

3 }
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This method returns 0 if argument guess equals secret and returns 1 otherwise.
An implicit information flow exists within this method because the method’s return value
depends on the value of secret. Consider the information-flow policy stating “method
return values must not reveal information about secret values”, notated M N I henceforth—
a variation of noninterference [43], which states that high, or secret inputs, have no observable
effect on low, or public, outputs. This policy is a hyperproperty at a fine-grained level because
an execution x ∈ Ef∞ containing both secret and public values must be compared with a, so
called, low-equivalent execution x0 ∈ Ef∞ , which is the same execution as x with all secret
inputs removed, such that x0 only contains low input values and public outputs, to determine
whether there is a distinguishable difference between the two executions. Let Ef∞H be the set
of all fine-grained executions containing both secret and nonsecret inputs, and public outputs
such that Ef∞h ⊆ Ef∞ ; let Ef∞L be the set of all fine-grained executions containing only nonsecret
inputs and public outputs such that Ef∞L ⊆ Ef∞ . Let N I : Ef∞H × Ef∞L → {true, f alse} be a
predicate that inputs two fine-grained traces x ∈ Ef∞H and x0 ∈ Ef∞L such that x0 ≈L x (i.e., x0
is low-equivalent to x) and outputs true if x and x0 are noninterfering, meaning that x0 does
not reveal any information about the secret values in x, and f alse otherwise. M N I can be
encoded as a fine-grained hyperproperty in the following way:
M N If = {X ⊆ Ef∞ | ∀x ∈ X : ∃x0 ∈ X : x0 ≈L x ∧ N I(x, x0 )}.
Because M N I is only concerned with method return values revealing information
about secret values, we can encode M N I as a medium-grained property ranging over the
possible sequences of method executions. Let N I ⊆ Em now refer to the set of all noninterfering methods (i.e., the set of all methods where the low-execution paths of the methods
do not reveal any information about secret values in the high-execution paths of the methods), and f alse otherwise. M N I can now be encoded as a medium-grained property in the
following way:
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∞
M N Im = {x ∈ Em
| ∀he, e0 i ∈ x : (e ∈ N I ⇒ e = e0 ) ∧ e0 ∈ N I}

Notice that the fine-grained encoding of M N I (i.e., M N If ) is a policy that is not
a property, because the policy defines a relationship between two fine-grained executions.
The medium-grained encoding of M N I (i.e., M N Im ) is a property, because the property
holds on each medium-grained trace in isolation. This change in policy classification is due
to the level of granularity at which the policy is encoded. Conceptually, medium-grained
events capture the code-body of medium grained events. A mechanism enforcing a policy
at a medium-grained level can analyze the body of medium-grained events before allowing
them to execute.
Runtime code analysis allows for more precise policy enforcement—as opposed to
static code analysis—by security mechanisms when they can determine program execution
paths based on runtime values. However, to enforce policies at this level of granularity, policy
writers must be familiar with low-level intermediate or machine code when source code is
not available.
Such medium-grained mechanisms have been used to enforce information-flow policies, such as information-release policies (e.g., [7]), which is a policy that downgrades the
security level of some information under certain conditions, thus allowing some information
to flow from secret values to nonsecret values. These mechanisms operate by intercepting
program execution at the guard of a conditional statement, and they perform code analysis
on the body of the statement to determine whether allowing the conditional to execute will
leak more sensitive information than what is allowed by the policy.

3.5

Coarse-Grained Policy Enforcement
A coarse-grained policy ranges over coarse-grained traces.

Definition 6. A policy Pc is coarse grained iff
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∞

Pc ⊆ 2Ec .
Definition 7. A property pˆc is coarse-grained iff
pˆc ⊆ Ec∞ .
Coarse-grained program events are whole programs. Policies can be enforced at this
level of granularity by performing code analysis on a whole program’s source, intermediate,
or binary code at runtime. Static code analyzers also analyze whole programs but cannot
take into account runtime information.
Static code analyzers can be encoded as runtime mechanisms by implementing them
to intercept program execution at a program’s entry point. For example, in many high-level
languages (e.g., Java, C/C++, and Rust) the entry point is at the main method. If a program
takes command line arguments, these arguments may be used to predict the execution paths
of the program. If the arguments can be used to rule out a number of execution paths, then
coarse-grained mechanisms can be more precise than statically operating mechanisms.
Many coarse-grained policies can be encoded as safety properties, where each trace
in the property is a single exchange containing the input program and an output program
event that satisfies the policy constraint. Recall that the first event in an exchange is an
attempted event, and the second event in an exchange is an event that is actually executed.
To illustrate how policies can be encoded as single-exchanged, coarse-grained properties, consider an example confidentiality policy, notated N N A, stipulating that programs
cannot access the network, perhaps to prevent them from sending sensitive information over
the network. Let N A ⊆ Ec be the set of all coarse-grained exchanges where the second
event in the exchange does not contain a network access. N N A can then be encoded in the
following way:
N N A = {he, e0 i ∈ Ec | he, e0 i ∈ N A}
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This coarse-grained policy encoding can capture the executions of static code analyzers and coarse-grained runtime monitors, where these mechanisms input a coarse-grained
event (i.e., a whole program) and output an event possibly satisfying the policy at hand.
We can determine whether a static code analyzer or coarse-grained runtime monitor soundly
enforces a policy by determining whether the set of mechanism executions is a subset of the
policy executions.
Due to the undecidability of coarse-grained code analysis, runtime mechanisms operating at this level cannot always precisely enforce policies; however, in some cases where the
decidability of the policy only depends on the runtime information gathered at the program’s
entry point (i.e., the command line arguments), coarse-grained runtime monitors can be more
permissive than static code analyzers. Programs containing both secure and insecure runs,
where the security of such programs depends on the values of command line arguments, will
always be rejected by static code analyzers. In contrast, coarse-grained runtime monitors
may be able to accept only the secure runs of such programs on the basis of their runtime
values.

3.6

Hybrid Policy Enforcement
Hybrid policies range over hybrid executions, where hybrid executions contain ex-

changes encoded at two or more levels of granularity.
Definition 8. A policy Ph is hybrid iff
∞

Ph ⊆ 2Eh
Definition 9. A property pˆh is hybrid iff

pˆh ⊆ Eh∞
47

Traditionally, hybrid mechanisms enforce policies by combining static code analysis
and runtime enforcement. We’ve shown in Section 3.5 that static code analyzers can be encoded as runtime mechanisms that monitor code at a coarse-grained level and in Section 3.3
that traditional, general-purpose runtime mechanisms are fine-grained mechanisms. Traditional hybrid mechanisms can be encoded in this framework as pure runtime mechanisms
that monitor both coarse- and fine-grained program events. However, our approach to hybrid
policy enforcement is more general because a hybrid policy ranging over hybrid executions
can contain coarse-, medium-, and fine-grained exchanges.
Mechanisms that enforce policies exclusively at coarse- or medium-grained levels may
not always be able to precisely predict control flow when medium-grained events are deeply
nested within coarse- and other medium-grained events (e.g., nested method calls). However, hybrid runtime mechanisms can overcome this limitation by refining policy enforcement
during a program’s execution. For example, program rewriters can be encoded as hybrid
runtime mechanisms by intervening at a program’s entry point for coarse-grained code analysis. If code modification or inlined checks are necessary, the mechanism can output a new
version of the program with the necessary modifications. A mechanism operating in this
way is similar to runtime mechanisms that replace unsafe library function calls with safe
versions (e.g., [14]), except the hybrid runtime mechanism outputs a coarser-grained program event, namely a safe program, with inlined checks for medium- or fine-grained events.
If the mechanism cannot decide how to respond when a medium-grained event is reached
during execution, perhaps due to nested method calls depending on runtime information,
the mechanism can further refine policy enforcement by outputting a new medium-grained
event with inlined checks to collect runtime information when the nested method calls are
reached.
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Chapter 4: Fine-Grained Policy Enforcement on Coauthentication

This chapter presents Coauthentication, which is a family of cryptographic protocols
for authentication [63]. Section 4.1 presents a brief overview of Coauthentication. Section 4.2
presents a protocol variant of Coauthentication, and Section 4.3 demonstrates how forward
secrecy is a property that can be enforced at a fine-grained level on the protocol variant
presented in Section 4.2. Section 4.4 presents formal verification results of the forwardsecure Coauthentication protocol, illustrating that the protocol does indeed satisfy forward
secrecy.

4.1

Coauthentication
Coauthentication [63] is a multi-instance, single-factor authentication method de-

signed to mitigate theft-based, phishing, man-in-the-middle, and replay attacks, which are
all common attacks for single-factor authentication methods [71]. Possible single-factor authentication methods are either knowledge-based (e.g., PINs or passwords), token-based
(e.g., authentication card), or biometrics-based (e.g., fingerprints or retina scan).
Multi-factor authentication methods aim to improve security by combining two or
more factors. For example, token- and knowledge-based factors can be combined to withdraw
money from ATM machines (i.e., a debit card and PIN). Multi-factor authentication methods
improve security because each factor must be compromised in order for an attack to be
successful [68]. However, when combining multiple factors, the overall authentication method
inherits each of the weaknesses and inconveniences associated with each factor. For example,
combining a debit card and PIN requires a user to remember to carry the debit card and
49

Authenticator

Requestor

Collaborator

1)
2)

3)
4)
5)

Message Legend:
1) 𝑅, {𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑞, 𝑁!}"!"
2) 𝐴, {𝑅, {𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑅𝑒𝑞, 𝐶, 𝑁#}"!" }"!#
3) 𝐴, {𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑅𝑒𝑞, 𝐶, 𝑁#}"!"
4) 𝑅, 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝, 𝐶, 𝑁# "!"
5) 𝐴, 𝐾$" , 𝐶, 𝑁! "!"
6) 𝑅, 𝐴𝑐𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 "$%

6)

Figure 4.1. A variation of a 2-device Coauthentication protocol.
remember the PIN. If a user loses the debit card, the user cannot authenticate to an ATM
with knowledge of the PIN alone; conversely, if the user forgets the PIN, in most cases, the
user cannot withdraw money with the debit card alone.
Coauthentication is designed to improve security in a way that multi-factor authentication does (i.e., requiring successful attacks to compromise all authentication factors involved) but without inheriting the weaknesses and inconveniences of multiple factors. Coauthentication is a token-based authentication method that requires users to use multiple
preregistered devices to authenticate to a system or service. Because Coauthentication only
requires devices, Coauthentication is a single-factor method; however, we call it a multiinstance, single-factor method because Coauthentication requires at least two devices to
authenticate to a system or service (i.e., multiple instances of the required factor).
The next section introduces a variation of a 2-device Coauthentication protocol.
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4.2

Coauthentication Protocol
The 2-device Coauthentication protocol, shown in Figure 4.1, consists of three com-

ponents: a requesting device, called the requestor, a collaborating device, called the collaborator, and an authentication server, called the authenticator. During device registration,
the authenticator and the requestor share a secret key KAR , and the authenticator and the
collaborator share a secret key KAC .
To authenticate to a service:
1. The requesting device initiates a Coauthentication session by sending its identifier R
and a message encrypted with key KAR to the authenticator. The encrypted message
contains an authentication request AuthReq and a nonce N1 , which will authenticate
the authenticator to the requestor.
2. The authenticator decrypts message 1) and sends its identifier A along with a doubly
encrypted message to the collaborating device; the inner message contains a collaboration request CollabReq, the collaborator’s identifier C, and a nonce N2 , which will
authenticate the collaborator to the authenticator, all encrypted with key KAR . The
outer message contains the inner message, and the requestor’s identifier R encrypted
with key KAC .
3. The collaborator decrypts the outer message of message 2) and forwards the authenticator’s identifier A and the inner message to the requestor. The authenticator’s
identifier is sent to inform the requestor that the message originated from the authenticator. Therefore, the requestor should use the key shared between itself and the
authenticator to decrypt the message (i.e., KAR ).
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4. The requestor decrypts message 3) and sends its identifier R and a message encrypted
with KAR containing a collaboration response CollabResp, the collaborator’s identifier
C, and nonce N2 to the authenticator.
5. The authenticator decrypts message 4) and sends its identifier A and a message encrypted with KAR containing a session key KSK , the collaborator’s identifier C, and
nonce N1 to the requestor.
6. The requestor decrypts message 6) with KAR and sends its identifier R and a message
encrypted with the session key KSK containing an acknowledgement to the authenticator.
Given n ≥ 2 preregistered devices, Coauthentication requires at least m ≥ 2 of the
preregistered devices to participate in an authentication. Therefore, the minimum number
of devices required for Coauthentication is two devices. The security of Couathentication
improves when n > 2. For example, if the number of preregistered devices n = 3 then
a user can authenticate with any number of m devices such that n ≥ m ≥ 2, providing
flexibility for a user to authenticate with any 2 out of the 3 preregistered devices. With
the n ≥ m ≥ 2 constraint, Coauthentication protects against the compromise of at most
m − 1 cryptographic keys. In the 2-device Coauthentication protocol shown in Figure 4.1,
Coauthentication protects against the compromise of at most one cryptographic key.

4.3

Enforcing Forward Secrecy
Forward secrecy is a desirable property for many authentication protocols. It requires

the session keys, which are short-term cryptographic keys, of previous sessions to be protected
from adversaries in the event that an adversary obtains a long-term cryptographic key in a
future session [73].
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The protocol shown in Figure 4.1 does not satisfy forward secrecy. If an attacker obtains KAR , the attacker can use KAR to obtain the session keys of previous Coauthentication
sessions, because KAR is never updated.
We can enforce forward secrecy on the 2-device Coauthentication protocol shown in
Figure 4.1 at a fine-grained level by equipping each preregistered, target device (i.e., the
requestor and collaborator) and the authenticator with a runtime monitor that enforces
forward secrecy, as shown in Figure 4.2. Each monitor monitors all messages incoming to
and outgoing from its target device and has the ability to modify messages as necessary. Each
monitor can be viewed as an inlined reference monitor that is inlined into its corresponding
target device; therefore, all messages sent between a target device and its corresponding
runtime monitor are local to the device and not publicly observable.
Device registration for the protocol shown in Figure 4.2 is similar to device registration
for the protocol shown in Figure 4.1. The authenticator and requestor share a secret key
KAR , and the authenticator and the collaborator share a secret key KAC . Each runtime
monitor has access to the secret keys stored by its corresponding target device. That is, the
requestor monitor has access to KAR , the collaborator monitor has access to KAC , and the
authenticator monitor has access to all keys stored by the authenticator (i.e., KAR and KAC ).
Furthermore, the authenticator monitor and the requestor monitor also initially share secret
key KAR , and the authenticator monitor and the collaborator monitor initially share secret
key KAC at device registration. During the protocol, the secret keys shared between each
device and the authenticator will remain the same, while the secret keys shared between the
runtime monitors will be updated to ensure forward secrecy.
At the start of the coauthentication session, the requestor will attempt to send an
authentication request to the authenticator. This message is intercepted by the requestor’s
monitor, decrypted with the key shared between the requestor and authenticator KAR , reencrypted with the key shared between the requestor monitor and the authenticator monitor,
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Figure 4.2. Enforcing forward secrecy on a 2-device couathentication protocol.
which is also KAR for the first run of coauthentication, and sent to the authenticator monitor.
The authenticator monitor decrypts the message with the key shared between itself and the
requestor monitor KAR , re-encrypts with the key shared between the authenticator and
requestor KAR , and forwards the message to the authenticator.
The authenticator then attempts to send a collaboration request to the collaborator,
which is a doubly encrypted message. The inner message is encrypted with the secret key
shared between the authenticator and requestor KAR , and the outer message is encrypted
with the secret key shared between the authenticator and the collaborator KAC . The authenticator monitor intercepts this message, decrypts the message first with KAC and then with
0
00
KAR , injects two new keys KAR
and KAR
into the inner message, re-encrypts the inner mes-

sage with the key shared between itself and the requestor monitor KAR and re-encrypts the
outer message with the secret key shared between itself and the collaborator monitor KAC ,
and sends the message to the collaborator monitor. The collaborator monitor decrypts the
message with the key shared between itself and the authenticator monitor KAC , re-encrypts
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the message with the key shared between the collaborator and the authenticator KAC , and
forwards the message to the collaborator.
The collaborator decrypts the message with the key shared between itself and the authenticator KAC and then attempts to forward the inner encrypted message to the requestor.
The collaborator monitor intercepts the message, and sends the message to the requestor
monitor over a private channel, assumed to be inaccessible to an attacker. The requestor
monitor decrypts the message with the key shared between itself and the authenticator mon0
00
itor, extracts the two new keys KAR
and KAR
, updates the key shared between itself and
0
the authenticator monitor to KAR
, re-encrypts the rest of the message with the key shared

between the requestor and authenticator KAR , and sends the message to the requestor.
The requestor then decrypts the message with the key shared between itself and the
authenticator KAR , and attempts to send a collaboration response to the authenticator, encrypted with KAR . The requestor monitor intercepts this message, decrypts it with the key
shared between the requestor and the authenticator KAR , re-encrypts it with the key shared
0
between itself and the authenticator monitor KAR
, and sends the message to the authenti-

cator monitor. The authenticator monitor then decrypts the message with the key shared
0
, re-encrypts it with the key shared between
between itself and the requestor monitor KAR

the authenticator and the requestor KAR , and sends the message to the authenticator.
The authenticator then decrypts the message with KAR and attempts to send the
session key encrypted with KAR to the requestor. The authenticator monitor then decrypts
0
the message with KAR , re-encrypts it with KAR
, and sends the message to the requestor
0
monitor. The requestor monitor then decrypts the message with KAR
, re-encrypts it with

KAR , and sends the message to the requestor.
The requestor decrypts the message with KAR , extracts the session key, and attempts
to send an acknowledgement to the authenticator encrypted with the session key KSK .
The requestor monitor then forwards the message to the authenticator monitor, and the
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0
authenticator monitor then forwards the message to the authenticator. Secret key KAR
is

discarded at the end of the current coauthentication session, and the authenticator monitor
00
and requestor monitor both update the key shared between themselves to secret key KAR
.

On the next Coauthentication session, the requestor will attempt to send an authentication request encrypted with KAR . The requestor monitor will then intercept this message,
decrypt it with KAR because it can access the key shared between the requestor and authenticator, re-encrypt the authentication request with the key shared between itself and
00
the authenticator monitor KAR
, and send the message to the authenticator monitor. The

rest of the protocol will continue as pictured in Figure 4.2, with each monitor decrypting all
messages outgoing from its target device with the key shared between the target device device and the destination device, and re-encrypting the messages with the key shared between
itself and the runtime monitor of the destination device; conversely, each monitor decrypts
each incoming message from a runtime monitor with the key shared between itself and the
runtime monitor, and re-encrypts the message with the key shared between its corresponding
target device and the origin device.

4.4

Formal Evaluation
The principal security properties of the example Coauthentication protocols shown

in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 have been formally verified with ProVerif [23, 24]. ProVerif uses
a resolution-based strategy to verify that protocols satisfy desired security properties. A
benefit of using ProVerif is that it can model arbitrarily many sessions of a protocol running
concurrently.

4.4.1 Protocol Modeling
The protocol encodings faithfully follow the communications shown in Figures 4.1
and 4.2. To model key updates in the protocol shown in Figure 4.2, we used key tables [25,
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p.37]. These key tables are only accessible to the runtime monitors of the legitimate actors
(i.e., Requestor Monitor, Authenticator Monitor, and Collaborator Monitor) of the protocol.
0
00
The protocols dynamically generate new keys (i.e., KAR
and KAR
) during an authentication
00
session, and at the end of the session, the new long-term key (KAR
) gets inserted into the

key table.
Each protocol session ran six processes (i.e., authenticator, authenticator monitor,
requestor, requestor monitor, collaborator, and collaborator monitor) and the main ProVerif
process considered arbitrarily many sessions of a protocol running concurrently.
The ProVerif encodings of the Coauthentication protocols shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2,
and the properties verified, are available online [35].

4.4.2 Attack Models and Assumptions
Coauthentication, like multi-factor techniques, protects against theft of any one authentication secret. The secrets in Coauthentication are cryptographic keys. Theft of Coauthentication secrets may occur in any way, including by remotely compromising devices to
obtain their stored keys or physically stealing devices.
Attackers are assumed to be active and can eavesdrop on, insert, delete, and modify
communications. Attackers may mount replay and man-in-the-middle attacks and are not
constrained to operate according to any of the protocols.
Attackers are however assumed to be incapable of cryptanalysis; attackers can only
infer plaintexts from ciphertexts when also having the required secret key. Without such an
assumption, attackers could extract credentials like session keys simply by monitoring and
cryptanalyzing legitimate authentications.
The Coauthentication protocol presented in Figure 4.2 protects against attackers who
know all of the secrets stored on a device that the victim user possesses. We call such attacks
key-duplication attacks. For example, an attacker may duplicate a device’s secret keys by
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remotely compromising the device. Alternatively, the attacker may physically steal a device,
duplicate all keys accessible to the device, and return the device to the victim user, who may
be unaware of the theft and duplication.
To protect against key-duplication attacks, the Coauthentication protocol presented
in Figure 4.2 assumes that a private communication channel, inaccessible to attackers, exists
between the requestor and collaborator devices. Such an assumption is necessary because
the duplicated keys must be updated through some channel inaccessible to the attacker;
otherwise, the attacker—who has all of the victim device D’s keys—could decrypt and obtain
any updated keys sent to D, and modify any updated keys sent from D. Private channels
may be implemented with short-range communications, such as NFC, zigbee, wireless USB,
infrared, or near-field magnetic induction, under the assumption that attackers cannot access
such communications because they are on direct, device-to-device channels.
The Coauthentication protocol presented in Figure 4.1 does not require a private
channel between the requestor and collaborator devices; consequently, this protocol does not
protect against key-duplication attacks. Therefore, we assume a weaker attack model for
this protocol, one that assumes authentication secrets (KAR and KAC ) are only accessible
to attackers through device theft (without duplicating the keys, and returning, the devices).
In other words, the attack model for this all-public-channel protocol assumes that if an
attacker obtained a device D’s authentication secret, then D’s legitimate user no longer
posesses D. In terms of the ProVerif encodings, this weaker attack model means that,
in cases where attackers are assumed to know KAR , the collaborator does not respond to
collaboration requests. The justification is that if an attacker has acquired KAR , then by
assumption the legitimate user does not possess the requestor, so collaboration requests must
be for unauthorized, attacker-initiated authentications. It is assumed that, with appropriate
collaboration policies, users do not approve collaborations for unauthorized authentications.
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Table 4.1. Verification setup of each protocol for three different runs.
Protocol

Attackers’ Knowledge
Run 1
Run 2
Run 3

Figure 4.1

No secrets

KAC

KAR

Figure 4.2

No secrets

KAC

00
KAR and KAR

Both Coauthentication protocols presented in this dissertation assume that devices
in the user’s possession run as intended during the Coauthentication process. Without such
an assumption, malware on the user’s requestor device could simply leak decrypted session
keys or any other unencrypted private data, and malware on the user’s collaborator device
could simply approve an attacker’s authentication requests. Protecting against malware that
is actively running on a device in the user’s possession, while the user is authenticating, is
beyond the scope of coauthentication.
Both Coauthentication protocols presented in this dissertation also assume that authenticators run as intended during the Coauthentication process. Without such an assumption, malware on the authenticator could simply leak secrets or allow all authentication
requests. Protecting against malware on authenticators is beyond the scope of Coauthentication.

4.4.3 Verification Setup
Each protocol was verified in 3 runs; as shown in Table 4.1.
1. The first run began with attackers knowing no secret keys.
2. The second run began with attackers knowing the long-term key accessible to the
collaborator. That is, attackers were given KAC ;
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Table 4.2. Verification results,“3” indicates that ProVerif proved the property.
P1: Secrecy of the KSK
Run 1
Run 2
Run 3

Protocol

P2: Authentication of R to A
Run 1
Run 2
Run 3

P3: Authentication of A to R
Run 1
Run 2
Run 3

Figure 4.1

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

Figure 4.2

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3. The third run began with attackers knowing all the long-term keys accessible to the
requestor. For the protocol shown in Figure 4.1, attackers were given KAR , and for the
00
protocol shown in Figure 4.2, attackers were given KAR and KAR
.

In all 3 runs of each of the protocols, we verified the following security properties.
1. P1: Secrecy of the session key.
• The session key KSK is only known to the authenticator and requestor. This
property subsumes forward secrecy of session keys (KSK ) in the third run of the
protocol shown in Figure 4.2 because knowing the requestor’s future authentica00
tion secret KAR
does not leak session keys.

2. P2: Authentication of R to A.
• With one exception, we specified authentication of R to A as requiring that if the
authenticator receives an acknowledgment of a session key (and therefore believes
it shares the session key with the requestor) then the requestor was indeed its
interlocutor and the collaborator indeed collaborated. This is an event-based
property [100] having the form

endA =⇒ (beginA ∧ collabA),
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where endA refers to the event of A receiving the acknowledgment, beginA to
R sending the authentication request, and collabA to C sending its participation
message (in the eighth message of Figure 4.2 and the third message of Figure 4.1).
The one exception to encoding P2 in this way is for the second run of the allpublic-channel protocol (Figure 4.1), where the attacker is given the long-term
key accessible to the collaborator (i.e., KAC ). In this case, the attacker may use
the collaborator’s key to obtain and collaborate with legitimate authentication requests, thus helping legitimate authentications succeed, which we do not consider
an attack. Therefore, for the second run of the Figure 4.1 protocols, we specify
property P2 as only requiring

endA =⇒ beginA,

that is, if the authenticator believes it shares the session key with the requestor
then the requestor was indeed its interlocutor (but the attacker, rather than the
collaborator, may have collaborated).
3. P3: Authentication of A to R.
• This property is symmetric to P2 and, with one exception, requires that if the
requestor sends an acknowledgment of a session key (and therefore believes it
shares the session key with the authenticator) then the authenticator was indeed
its interlocutor and the collaborator indeed collaborated. This property has the
form
endR =⇒ (beginR ∧ collabR),
where endR refers to R sending the acknowledgment, beginR to A receiving the
authentication request, and collabR to C sending its participation message.
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As with P2, the one exception to encoding P3 in this way is for the second run
of the all-public-channel protocol (Figure 4.1), in which case P3 only requires

endR =⇒ beginR,

for the same reason explained for property P2.

4.4.4 Verification Results
Table 4.2 shows the verification results. ProVerif found no attacks on any of properties
P1–P3 in any runs of either of the protocols. That is, ProVerif did not refute any of P1–P3
in any runs of either of the protocols.
ProVerif proved P1–P3 for all three runs of both protocols. We also note that these
results are for the stronger, injective-correspondence versions of properties P2 and P3. The
injective-correspondence versions require there to be a unique predecessor event for each
end event [25, pp.19–22]; for example, the injective version of P2 requires that for each
endA event there exists a unique beginA predecessor event. The non-injective versions allow
end events to have non-unique predecessor events. ProVerif was able to prove the weaker,
non-injective version of property P2 for all runs of both protocols.
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Chapter 5: Implementation

This chapter presents details about our prototype implementation of the theoretical
framework presented in Chapter 3 and explains how granular security policies can be enforced
on Java bytecode applications at runtime.

5.1

Architecture
The implementation is composed of 3 core components: AspectJ, a code analyzer,

and JaBRO.

5.1.1 AspectJ
AspectJ is an aspect-oriented Java language extension that allows policy writers to
define aspects [54], similar to Java classes. Aspects contain pointcuts, which capture one
or more join points, and advice. “Join points are well-defined points in the execution of
the program” [54, p. 329]. Table 5.1 lists the join point types allowed by AspectJ and the
possible policy granularities enforceable at each join point. The main method execution is
the only join point that can be used to enforce a coarse-grained policy because it is the entry
point of the program. Any join point that has a body of code provides the capability for
enforcing medium-grained policies, and every join point provides the capability for enforcing
fine-grained policies, because fine-grained policies do not require code analysis. Advice is
a block of code written by the policy writer that directs a mechanism on how to enforce a
particular policy. Before advice directs a mechanism to execute some block of code before a
security-relevant event occurs. For example, a policy may require all file system operations
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Table 5.1. Possible policy granularities enforceable at each AspectJ join point type.
AspectJ join point type
Main method execution
Non-main method execution
Method call
Constructor call
Static-initializer execution
Object pre-initialization
Object initialization
Handler execution
Advice execution
Field reference
Field assignment

Coarse
X

Medium
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Fine
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

to be logged. Therefore, the mechanism can intercept all file system operations and log
them before allowing them to proceed. After advice directs a mechanism to execute some
block of code after a security-relevant event occurs, but before proceeding to the next event.
For example, a mechanism may be required to execute additional code after an exception is
thrown. Lastly, around advice directs a mechanism to execute a block of code instead of a
security-relevant event. For example, a mechanism can replace all unsafe library methods
with safe versions.

5.1.2 Code Analyzer
The code analyzer is code written by the policy writer to analyze Java class files
(e.g., data or control flow analysis). This analysis ensures that a body of code adheres to
the security policy in question. For example, a policy may disallow Java applications from
running external programs. To enforce this policy, a code analyzer can analyze all class files
of an application to ensure that the application does not use the java.lang.Runtime.exec()
method.
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5.1.3 JaBRO
JaBRO (Java Bytecode Rewriter and Optimizer) is an extensible Java library that we
have developed to extend the functionality of AspectJ to enable code analysis on optimized
bytecode at runtime. It is composed of Javassist [29], which is a Java library for editing Java
bytecode, and Soot [93], which is a program analysis and code optimization tool for Java
bytecode.
JaBRO uses Javassist to rewrite Java bytecode to include runtime arguments that are
observed during a program’s execution. JaBRO is currently able to rewrite Java bytecode
to include runtime arguments of all primitive types, and String and File objects. Once
JaBRO rewrites the bytecode of the original application to include runtime information,
JaBRO invokes Soot to propagate the runtime information throughout the application and
performs program optimizations where necessary. JaBRO is extensible because policy writers
can extend JaBRO to be able to rewrite Java bytecode to include runtime arguments of
arbitrary types.
The following code in Listing 5.1 illustrates how a policy writer may write an aspect
that uses JaBRO to enforce a policy on the example writeSubString method presented in
Chapter 3.
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Listing 5.1. An example aspect for enforcing a medium-grained policy
public a s p e c t Monitor {
void around ( int i , S t r i n g s ) :
c a l l ( public void w r i t e S u b S t r i n g ( int , S t r i n g ) )
&& a r g s ( i , s ){
S t r i n g className = t h i s J o i n P o i n t . g e t S i g n a t u r e ( )
. getDeclaringTypeName ( ) ;
S t r i n g methodName = t h i s J o i n P o i n t . g e t S i g n a t u r e ( )
. getName ( ) ;
S t r i n g d e p e n d e n c i e s = System
. getProperty ( ‘ ‘ user . dir ’ ’ )
+F i l e . s e p a r a t o r + ‘ ‘ example . j a r ’ ’ ;

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25 }

try {
JaBRO j = new JaBRO( className , methodName ,
new Object [ ] { i , s } , d e p e n d e n c i e s ) ;
F i l e f = j . runMediumMethod ( ) ;
CodeAnalyzer c = new CodeAnalyzer ( f ) ;
i f ( c . checkResourcesReleased ()){
proceed ( i , s ) ;
} else {
defaultMethod ( ) ;
}
} catch ( Exc ep tio n e ){ /∗ o m i t t e d ∗/ }
}

The advice and pointcut is specified in lines 2–4. This policy uses around advice because if the method violates the policy, the policy writer can direct the mechanism to output
an alternative method that does not violate the policy. The advice takes two arguments
String s and int i, which corresponds to the runtime arguments for the writeSubString
method.

The pointcut call(public void writeSubString(int,String)) denotes the

security-relevant event to intercept, and args(i,s) binds int i and String s to the runtime arguments of writeSubString. Lines 5-6 use the thisJoinPoint construct to obtain
writeSubString’s enclosing class name (i.e., the class that writeSubString is declared
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Target
Program
Policy

AspectJ
Compiler

Monitored
Program

Aspect

Figure 5.1. Weaving a fine-grained policy into a target program.
in). Lines 7-8 use the thisJoinPoint construct to get the fully qualified method name for
writeSubString. The program’s dependencies are retrieved from the path to the program
in line 9. Java applications can be packaged as JAR files that contain all of an application’s
dependent class files. We can retrieve the application dependencies by specifying the path
to the application’s JAR file. In this case, we assume writeSubString is a part of the
example.jar application. Lines 14-15 create a new JaBRO object that takes as input the
method’s enclosing class name, the fully qualified method name, an array of the method’s
arguments, and the program’s dependencies. JaBRO is then invoked for a medium-grained
method and returns the class file with an optimized writeSubString method in line 16. The
optimized class file is passed to the code analyzer in line 17. If writeSubString satisfies
the policy then writeSubString proceeds with its original runtime arguments in line 19,
otherwise the policy writer specifies how the mechanism should handle the policy violation
in line 21 (i.e., execute a defaultMethod() assumed to satisfy the policy at hand).
JaBRO allows policies that are conservatively enforced statically to be enforced more
precisely at runtime by taking into account runtime information. Policy writers can use
JaBRO as an external library to aid in precise policy enforcement when writing policies to
be enforced at runtime. JaBRO is publicly available online [34].
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Figure 5.2. Weaving a coarse- or medium-grained policy into a target program.
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Figure 5.3. Runtime enforcement of coarse- or medium-grained policy.
5.2

Policy Enforcement
Coarse- and medium-grained policies are composed of an aspect, JaBRO, and a code

analyzer. Fine-grained policies only consist of an aspect and can be implemented with
just the native AspectJ language constructs because they do not require code analysis. To
monitor the target program, the AspectJ compiler is used to weave the policy into the target
program, producing a self-monitoring program as shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2.
Figure 5.3 illustrates how coarse- and medium-grained policies are enforced during a
monitored program’s execution:
1. A security-relevant event is intercepted by a pointcut.
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Figure 5.4. Runtime enforcment of a fine-grained policy.
2. Event context information, which includes the event name, its enclosing class name,
and runtime arguments, and the program’s dependencies are input to JaBRO, which
is invoked from inside of the advice.
• AspectJ provides the capability to obtain the event context information through
the join point construct.
• The program’s dependencies are needed to resolve type information during the
optimization process.
JaBRO uses the event’s context information to obtain the class file in which the event
is declared from the system search path. JaBRO then rewrites the event to include
its runtime arguments within the event’s code body. If the policy is coarse grained,
JaBRO optimizes all of the program’s class files. If the policy is medium grained,
JaBRO only optimizes the class file that the event is declared in.
3. Code analysis is performed on the optimized class file(s), and an analysis result is
output.
4. The policy decision point decides to execute, suppress, or insert an event based on the
analysis result.
To further illustrate JaBRO’s functionality and its importance, consider the
writeSubString(5,"Hello, World!") method call presented in Chapter 3. After obtain69

ing writeSubString’s enclosing class file, JaBRO first rewrites the method by inserting the
method’s runtime arguments in the following way:
Listing 5.2. JaBRO rewriting a method with its runtime argumented
1 public void w r i t e S u b S t r i n g ( int index , S t r i n g s ){
2

int i n d e x = 5 ;

3

S t r i n g s = ” H e l l o , World ! ” ;

4

F i l e W r i t e r w r i t e r = null ;

5

try {

6

w r i t e r = new F i l e W r i t e r (new F i l e ( ” s u b s t r i n g s . t x t ” ) ) ;

7

i f ( i n d e x < 10){

8

S t r i n g newS = s . s u b s t r i n g ( 0 , i n d e x ) ;

9

w r i t e r . w r i t e ( newS ) ;
writer . close ( ) ;

10

} else {

11
12

S t r i n g newS = s . s u b s t r i n g ( i n d e x ) ;

13

w r i t e r . w r i t e ( newS ) ;
}

14
15

} catch ( IOException e ){

16

i f ( w r i t e r != null ){

17

writer . close ( ) ;
}

18
19

}

20 }

After rewriting, JaBRO propagates the arguments throughout the method in the
following way:
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Listing 5.3. JaBRO propagating runtime values throughout the method
1 public void w r i t e S u b S t r i n g ( int index , S t r i n g s ){
2

int i n d e x = 5 ;

3

S t r i n g s = ” H e l l o , World ! ” ;

4

F i l e W r i t e r w r i t e r = null ;

5

try {

6

w r i t e r = new F i l e W r i t e r (new F i l e ( ” s u b s t r i n g s . t x t ” ) ) ;

7

i f ( 5 < 10){

8

S t r i n g newS = ” H e l l o , World ! ” . s u b s t r i n g ( 0 , 5 ) ;

9

w r i t e r . w r i t e ( newS ) ;
writer . close ( ) ;

10

} else {

11
12

S t r i n g newS = ” H e l l o , World ! ” . s u b s t r i n g ( 5 ) ;

13

w r i t e r . w r i t e ( newS ) ;
}

14
15

} catch ( IOException e ){

16

i f ( w r i t e r != null ){

17

writer . close ( ) ;
}

18
19

}

20 }

After propagating the arguments throughout the method, JaBRO optimizes the
method in the following way:
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Listing 5.4. JaBRO optimizing a method
1 public void w r i t e S u b S t r i n g ( int index , S t r i n g s ){
2

F i l e W r i t e r w r i t e r = null ;

3

try {

4

w r i t e r = new F i l e W r i t e r (new F i l e ( ” s u b s t r i n g s . t x t ” ) ) ;

5

S t r i n g newS = ” H e l l o , World ! ” . s u b s t r i n g ( 0 , 5 ) ;

6

w r i t e r . w r i t e ( newS ) ;

7

writer . close ( ) ;

8

} catch ( IOException e ){

9

i f ( w r i t e r != null ){

10

writer . close ( ) ;
}

11
12

}

13 }

Given the runtime values, JaBRO is able to eliminate the else branch. A policy
stipulating that file resources acquired in a method be released before the end of the method’s
execution can be enforced more precisely by performing code analysis on the optimized
method, shown in Listing 5.4, rather than on the original method, shown in Listing 3.1.
Figure 5.4 illustrates how policies can be enforced at a fine-grained level. Similar to
coarse- and medium-grained policies, security-relevant events are intercepted by pointcuts
defined in the aspect. The policy decision point can then make an enforcement decision,
which may use event context information.
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Chapter 6: Empirical Evaluation

This chapter presents details about the empirical evaluation of our implementation.

6.1

Case Study
To evaluate the effectiveness of the implementation, we enforced three security policies

on two popular, open-source Java applications. The first application was the US National
Archives and Resource Administration’s (NARA) file analyzer and metadata harvester [92],
which analyzes and collects metadata on files, and can execute tests on files in a given
directory. The second application was JPlag [1], which is a software plagiarism detection
tool. Both of these applications can conduct operations on files and have the ability to access
potentially sensitive information stored on a system; therefore, these capabilities permitted
us to express practical policies over the applications.
We implemented policies to cover each level of granularity (i.e, coarse, medium, and
fine). The coarse-grained policy disallowed network connections by prohibiting the use of
java.net.Socket. This policy was enforced to ensure that neither application could exfiltrate sensitive information over the network. The medium-grained policy required file
resources acquired within a method to be released before the end of the method’s execution [66]. Because both applications were able to access the file system and perform file
operations, it was imperative to ensure that the applications could not deplete system resources. The fine-grained policy required files containing sensitive information to be hidden
from the applications. This policy was enforced by checking whether the values of file oper-
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Table 6.1. Average experimental performance results of 100 runs.
Policy
Coarse

Application
AspectJ
weaving
(ms)
NARA File
Analyzer and
Metadata
Harvester
JPlag
(v2.11.8)

Medium

(ms)

(ms)

AspectJ
weaving
(ms)

2290

11

33540

2590

392

32550

Unmonitored Monitored

Fine

(ms)

(ms)

AspectJ
weaving
(ms)

2910

0.26

1010

3580

0.39

1690

Unmonitored Monitored

Unmonitored Monitored
(ms)

(ms)

2910

0.10

0.11

2520

0.02

0.03

ations (i.e., file names) were contained in a sensitive file list. This policy was important to
limit the access rights of the applications.
To evaluate the overhead introduced by the implementation, we measured the average
time to weave and enforce each policy. Results are shown in Table 6.1. The AspectJ compiler
was used to weave each policy into each target application as shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2.
The average execution time of each program event was measured without enforcing the policy,
indicated by the columns labeled unmonitored, and with enforcing the policy, indicated by
the columns labeled monitored. The NARA file analyzer and metadata harvester application
required user interaction; therefore, instead of measuring the total execution time of the
application, we measured the time to enforce the coarse-grained policy, for the monitored
column, and the time to start-up the application, for the unmonitored colunn. Each policy
was enforced separately on each application. Each experiment was conducted 100 times on a
MacBook Pro laptop with a 2.9 GHz Quad-Core Intel Core i7 processor and 16 GB of RAM.

6.2

Summary of Results
Each of the policies were successfully enforced on both applications. The results in

Table 6.1 indicate that the execution times of the applications were significantly impacted
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by the enforcement of the coarse- and medium-grained policies, which is due to the execution time of JaBRO and the code analyzer. At a coarse-grained level, the entire application
must be traversed twice: first, JaBRO must rewrite the main method and optimize the
entire application, and second, code analysis must be conducted on the entire optimized
application. The overhead introduced by coarse-grained policy enforcement is likely unacceptable for time-sensitive applications. However, for security-critical applications where
runtime performance is not a concern and static analysis is too conservative, the approach
may be advantageous. The overhead introduced by medium-grained policy enforcement may
be more acceptable due to the smaller code fragment traversed by JaBRO and the code analyzer. The fine-grained policy only added 0.01 ms to the execution time of the fine-grained
event for both applications.
We expected coarse-grained policies to be weaved significantly faster than mediumand fine-grained policies because the policy only needs to be weaved at a single point (i.e.,
the main method); however, the AspectJ compiler cannot differentiate between policy granularities and thus searched through the entire application looking for all possible matches
to the main join point. The weaving time for coarse-grained policies may be improved by
implementing a custom bytecode rewriter tailored for weaving coarse-grained policies.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Future Work

This dissertation has aimed to improve our understanding of security mechanisms
and how they enforce policies by presenting a unifying theory of security mechanisms. The
theory included a framework in which all mechanisms are encoded as runtime mechanisms
that operate at one or more levels of program code granularity. The practicality of the
theoretical framework was demonstrated through a prototype implementation for enforcing
security policies on Java bytecode applications. This chapter summarizes this dissertation’s
contributions (Section 7.1) and presents directions for future work (Section 7.2).

7.1

Summary
The first contribution of this dissertation is a formal framework for reasoning about

security policy enforcement. The framework casts existing classes of security mechanisms into
runtime mechanisms that operate at one or more levels of code granularity. A new taxonomy
of security policies was presented based on the granularity of well-defined, modular program
constructs that mechanisms analyze to enforce policies. We have shown that previous work
has encoded security policies as fine-grained policies, but not all security mechanisms enforce
policies at such a fine-grained level. Some policies can be encoded at a coarse- or mediumgrained level, and such granular policy encodings can capture the executions of security
mechanisms that operate at one or more levels of code granularity. This dissertation also
presented a practical example of how forward secrecy can be enforced at a fine-grained level
on an authentication method called Coauthentication [63].
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The second contribution of this dissertation is a prototype implementation of the theoretical framework for enforcing security policies at various levels of code granularity on Java
bytecode applications. The effectiveness and precision of the implementation hinges on an
extensible Java library that we have developed called JaBRO. JaBRO allows runtime mechanisms operating at medium- and coarse-grained levels to enforce policies more precisely than
statically operating mechanisms. We have evaluated the overhead introduced by the implementation by enforcing security policies at each level of code granularity. Coarse-grained
policy enforcement significantly inhibits the runtime performance of applications because
applications must be traversed twice: first by JaBRO and second by the code analyzer. We
realize that the overhead introduced by coarse-grained policy enforcement may be unacceptable for time-sensitive applications; however, coarse-grained policy enforcement can still be
beneficial for security-critical applications in cases where static enforcement is too conservative. Medium-grained policy enforcement may be more acceptable, depending on the size of
the medium-grained event, and fine-grained policy enforcement did not significantly inhibit
runtime performance

7.2

Future Work
The work presented in this dissertation can be extended in several ways. This section

will discuss two possible directions for future work.

7.2.1 Additional Theoretical Analysis
One possible direction for future work would be additional theoretical analysis to
determine the class of policies enforceable by runtime mechanisms with constrained sets
of capabilities that operate at one or more levels of code granularity. Previous work has
shown the class of policies enforceable by various runtime mechanisms with constrained
sets of capabilities that only operate at the fine-grained level (e.g., execution monitors, edit
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automata, mandatory results automata, stream monitoring automata, etc.). It would be
interesting to see which class of policies are enforceable by each sort of mechanism when
operating at each level of granularity and at two or more levels of granularity.

7.2.2 Domain-Specific Policy-Specification Languages
Another possible direction for future work would be to design and implement domainspecific policy-specification languages for granular security policies based on various language
constructs. Policy-specification languages are important for policy writers because they can
provide guarantees that the policy implemented is the policy intended through the languages
type system and formal verification techniques [45]. Domain-specific policy-specification
languages, designed around language constructs, might enable the synthesis of new kinds of
runtime security mechanisms.
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